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Abstract
The GTAP model, versions 4.1 and lower, suffers from some defects in the
implementation of the regional household demand system. Most seriously, the
upper level of the demand system assumes that each regional household faces a
fixed price for utility from private consumption. But with a private consumption
demand system of the CDE form, the price of utility from private consumption
depends on the level of private consumption expenditure. With no fixed price for
utility from private consumption, the familiar Cobb-Douglas demand system does
not apply. Accordingly, the upper-level demand equations are in error.
Furthermore, utility and equivalent variation are wrongly computed in simulations with non-standard settings for the CDE expansion parameters. Even with
the standard settings, in multi-step simulations the utility and equivalent variation
computations are inexact. The welfare decomposition inherits the defects of the
equivalent variation computation.
In removing these defects we revise in passing some minor misfeatures of the old
treatment: Firstly, we treat the entire final demand system as the demand system
of a representative household, rather than a conglomeration of representative and
region-wide demand systems (subsection 2.6). Secondly, we provide a new facility
for shifting the allocation of regional income exogenously by modifying rather than
overriding the final demand system (subsection 2.14). Finally, we eliminate an
uninterpretable “nuisance term” from the decomposition of equivalent variation
(subsection 4.3).
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1

Introduction

The GTAP model, versions 4.1 and lower, suffers from some defects in the implementation of the regional household demand system:
• The upper level of the demand system assumes that each regional household faces
a fixed price for utility from private consumption. But with a private consumption
demand system of the CDE form, the price of utility from private consumption
depends on the level of private consumption expenditure. With no fixed price for
utility from private consumption, the familiar Cobb-Douglas demand system does
not apply. Accordingly, the upper-level demand equations are in error.
• Utility and equivalent variation are wrongly computed in simulations with nonstandard settings for the CDE expansion parameters. Even with the standard
settings, in multi-step simulations the utility and equivalent variation computations are inexact.
• The welfare decomposition inherits the defects of the equivalent variation computation.
In removing these defects we revise in passing some minor misfeatures of the old
treatment:
• We treat the entire final demand system as the demand system of a representative household, rather than a conglomeration of representative and region-wide
demand systems (subsection 2.6).
• We provide a new facility for shifting the allocation of regional income exogenously
by modifying rather than overriding the final demand system (subsection 2.14).
• We eliminate an uninterpretable “nuisance term” from the decomposition of equivalent variation (subsection 4.3).
The main disadvantage of the new treatment relative to the old is that its implementation and properties are somewhat more complex. It requires more equations and variables, mostly to support an exact calculation of the equivalent variation. Also, whereas
the old treatment allocated regional income in fixed shares between private consumption expenditure, government household expenditure, and saving, the new treatment
allows the shares to vary in response to changes in income and consumer prices.
This paper describes the new treatment. In its electronic form, it should be accompanied by several program files—source code, gtap.tab, for the revised solution
program, a Tablo stored input file gtap.fts showing a typical model condensation,
and a GTAP test simulation command file ghom.cmf showing a typical model closure.
We include extensive listings of new and old source code. Listings of old source
code come from a GTAP model version 5 prerelease used in the August 2000 GTAP
short course, incorporating Ken Itakura’s reorganization of the code structure but no
relevant changes in the model theory over version 4.1. We do not describe but rather
take as given the standard GTAP model notation; the paper should accordingly be read
1

in conjunction with the source code or the original GTAP model documentation (Hertel
and Tsigas [5]). The source code, together with command files for certain illustrative
simulations (section 5), is included in an accompanying software package (appendix C).
We adopt the convention that a lower-case symbol denotes percentage change in the
corresponding upper-case symbol; so for a variable X, x denotes percentage change in
X, that is, x = (1/100)(d X/X).

2
2.1

The upper level of the regional household demand system
The old treatment

In the GTAP model as originally implemented (Hertel and Tsigas [5]), in each region
a regional household allocates regional income so as to maximize per capita aggregate
utility according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The maximand is described as
“aggregate” utility because it comprises both government and private sector behavior.
The arguments in the utility function are per capita utility from private consumption,
per capita utility from government consumption, and per capita real saving. We refer
to these as the upper-level commodities of the final demand system.
Real saving is a single commodity, defined as saving deflated by a saving price.
Utility from government consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of government consumption of individual commodities. Per capita utility from private consumption is
aggregated from per capita private consumption of individual commodities following
Hanoch’s ([3]) constant difference elasticity (CDE ) demand system.
We note that in the private consumption demand system, unlike the government
consumption demand system, the variable maximized is a per capita rather than an
economy-wide utility. This is necessary because the private consumption demand system is non-homothetic. The allocation of private consumption expenditure across commodities depends on the sum to be allocated, and the appropriate sum variable is not
economy-wide but per capita private consumption expenditure.
The CDE demand system is characterized by an implicit expenditure-cum-indirectutility function,
µ ¶Υi
X
Pi
Υi Ri
1=
Bi U
,
(2.1)
X
i

where U denotes utility, Pi , the price of commodity i, X, expenditure, and Bi , Υi , and
Ri , various parameters. Following Hanoch [3], we call the Bi distribution parameters,
the Υi substitution parameters, and the Ri expansion parameters. Constraints on the
parameters are:
∀i, Bi > 0,
∀i, Ri > 0,
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and either
∀i, Υi < 0
or
∀i, 0 < Υi < 1.
Although we are not required to do so by theory, in standard GTAP data bases we
normalize the expansion parameters so that their share-weighted sum is equal to one,
X
SiP Ri = 1,
i

where SiP denotes the share of commodity i in private consumption expenditure.
This completes the specification the final demand system; it remains to work out
the implications of the specification. This is done briefly in Hertel and Tsigas ([5]), but
to support later discussion (subsection 2.2) we provide here a more detailed derivation
for the upper level of the system.
We write the upper-level utility function as
U = CUPBP UGBG USBS ,

(2.2)

where U denotes per capita aggregate utility, UP , per capita utility from private consumption, UG , per capita government consumption, and US , per capita real saving, and
BP , BG , and BS are distribution parameters.
We define a saving price PS , and postulate the existence of suitable price indices
PG and PP for utility from government and private consumption. Then given income
Y , the regional household maximizes U subject to the budget constraint
N (PP UP + PG UG + PS US ) = Y,

(2.3)

where N denotes population.
Since the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, we expect the regional household to
allocate regional income in fixed shares between the upper-level commodities:
BP
Y,
B
BG
Y,
YG =
B
BS
YS =
Y,
B
YP =

(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)

where B denotes the sum of the distribution parameters, B = BP +BG +BS , YP private
consumption expenditure, YP = N PP UP , YG government consumption expenditure,

3

YG = N PG UG , and YS saving, YS = N PS US . Then
BP
Y,
B
BG
N P G UG =
Y,
B
BS
Y.
N P S US =
B
N P P UP =

Putting
QP = N U P ,

(2.7)

QG = N U G ,

(2.8)

QS = N U S ,

(2.9)

where QP denotes private consumption, QG government consumption, and QS saving,
we obtain
BP
Y,
B
BG
Y,
P G QG =
B
BS
P S QS =
Y.
B
P P QP =

To allow for exogenous shocks in the allocation of saving, we define “slack variables”
KS and KG for saving and utility from government consumption, initially equal to one.
We insert these into the corresponding demand equations:
BG
Y,
B
BS
P S QS = K S
Y.
B

P G QG = K G

Differentiating and rearranging, we obtain
qG = y − p G + κ G ,

(2.10)

qS = y − p S + κ S .

(2.11)

These appear in the old code as:
Equation GOVERTU
# computation of utility from government consumption (HT 39) #
(all,r,REG)
ug(r) = y(r) - pgov(r) + govslack(r);

and
Equation SAVINGS
# regional demand for savings (HT 38) #

4

(all,r,REG)
qsave(r) = y(r) - psave(r) + saveslack(r) ;

In the presence of shocks to the slack variables, the upper-level demand system is
no longer operative; the budget constraint however must still be observed. Accordingly,
we include in the model not the demand equation for utility from private consumption
but instead the budget constraint
YP = Y − Y G − Y S .
We express government consumption
expenditure YG as the sum of expenditures
P
on individual commodities, YG = i YGi , where YGi denotes government consumption
expenditure on commodity i, YGi = PGi QGi , where PGi denotes the price of commodity i
when purchased for government consumption, and QGi government consumption of
commodity i. Then
X
YP = Y −
YGi − YS
i

=Y −

X

PGi QGi − PS QS ,

i

or, in percentage change form,
Y P yP = Y y −

X

YGi (pGi + qGi ) − YS (pS + qS ).

i

This appears in the old code as:
Equation PRIVATEXP
# private consumption expenditure (HT 8) # (all,r,REG)
PRIVEXP(r)*yp(r)
= INCOME(r)*y(r)
- SAVE(r)*[psave(r) + qsave(r)]
- sum(i,TRAD_COMM, VGA(i,r)*[pg(i,r) + qg(i,r)])
;

Finally, we compute utility. Substituting for UG and US from equations (2.8)
and (2.9) into equation (2.2), we have
U=

CUPBP

µ

QG
N

¶ BG µ

QS
N

¶ BS

.

Differentiating, we obtain
u = BP uP + BG (qG − n) + BS (qS − n)
¸
·
BG
BS
BP
uP +
(qG − n) +
(qS − n)
=B
B
B
B
¸
·
YG
YS
YP
uP +
(qG − n) +
(qS − n) ,
=B
Y
Y
Y
5

(2.12)

using equations (2.4–2.6). Then, setting B = 1, we have
Y u = YP uP + YG (qG − n) + YS (qS − n).

(2.13)

This appears in the old code as:
Equation UTILITY
# computation of per capita regional utility (HT 37) #
(all,r,REG)
INCOME(r)*u(r)
= PRIVEXP(r)*up(r)
+ GOVEXP(r)*[ug(r) - pop(r)]
+ SAVE(r)*[qsave(r) - pop(r)]
;

2.2

Defects in the old treatment: identification

While the old treatment has proven serviceable in many GTAP applications, it is not
without defects. We identify three, of very different magnitude:
• It is slightly confusing in formulation, shifting unnecessarily between unitary and
representative households, and economy-wide and per capita utilities.
• In setting saving or government consumption exogenously, the user cannot adjust
preferences within the upper-level demand system, but must override them. There
are some advantages to maintaining a working upper-level demand system even
when some upper-level demands are exogenized.
• The underlying theory (subsection 2.1) is invalid; the model equations do not
logically follow from the theory’s premises.
The first, and very minor, objection to the old treatment is that in formulation it
is slightly incoherent. The upper-level utility function is attributed to a unitary “regional household”, that is, a notional single agent that takes all the income and does
all the consumption in the region. But its arguments are per capita variables. That
would suggest that the utility function should be attributed to a “representative household”, that is, to any one of a large notional collection of identical small households
which together absorb the income and perform the consumption of their region. The
government consumption variable in the upper-level utility function is per capita government consumption, but in the government consumption demand system the variable
is economy-wide government consumption. Utility from private consumption pertains
to a representative private household, and utility from government consumption to a
“government household”, both distinct from the “regional household” that enjoys aggregate utility.
Taking a sympathetic view of the old system, we may note that it is based informally
on the representative household concept, but employs some plausible simplifications for
homothetic sub-systems (in particular, government consumption). Taking it literally,
however, it contains some slight disconnections between the upper and lower levels.
6

Since we need (later in this subsection) to examine closely the interactions between the
levels, it is useful to identify and remove these disconnections, even at the expense of
belaboring a small issue.
Taking the old treatment literally, we are not entitled to talk about upper and
lower levels of the demand system. To do so would imply that they are part of the
same agent’s demand system, whereas logically they pertain to different agents. More
specifically, the aggregate utility function pertains to a unitary regional household that
displays an altruistic interest in the welfare of the representative private household, and
also cares about a variable, per capita government consumption, that is related to but
distinct from the welfare of the government household. We deliberately slur over these
niceities in deriving the old system (subsection 2.1). In discussing below (in this subsection) the more substantive defects of the old system, we override them, treating all
the demand subsystems as components of a representative regional household demand
system. Finally, in presenting the new treatment, we consistently follow the representative agent approach (subsection 2.6), and implement the associated minor substantive
changes (subsection 2.8).
The second limitation of the old treatment, also minor, is that the saving and
government consumption slack variables, KS and KG , override rather than modify the
upper-level demand system. We should be able to represent exogenous shifts in income
disposition as shifts in preferences in the upper-level demand system. This would have
three advantages:
• It would let us shock demand for any of the three upper-level commodities. The
old treatment lets us shock either saving or government consumption but not
private consumption.
• It would let the upper-level demand system do some work even when some external outcomes are imposed. For example, while exogenizing saving, we could let
the demand system allocate remaining income between private and government
consumption. In the old treatment, with saving exogenous, the demand system
determines government consumption expenditure, but private consumption expenditure is determined residually; since if the demand system were allowed to
determine it, expenditure and saving would not sum to income.
• It would allow us to obtain meaningful welfare results even when some upper-level
income allocations are set exogenously.
The main defect in the old treatment is that the demand equations are invalid. The
error is in the old upper-level budget constraint (2.3), N (PP UP + PG UG + PS US ) = Y .
In adopting this formulation for the constraint, the old treatment assumes that the
regional household can obtain utility from private consumption at some fixed price P P .
This assumption is non-trivial and in fact unwarranted.
We rewrite the old upper-level budget constraint as
PP UP + PG UG + PS US = X,

7

(2.14)

where X denotes per capita income. Recalling that utility from private consumption
and utility from government consumption are defined within the private and government
consumption demand subsystems, we obtain the general form of the constraint,
EP (PP , UP ) + EG (PG , UG ) + PS US = X,

(2.15)

where EP and EG are per capita expenditure functions, and PP and PG price vectors,
for private and government consumption. It might so happen that the expenditure
functions were of the form
EP (PP , UP ) = ΠP (PP )UP ,

(2.16)

EG (PG , UG ) = ΠG (PG )UG
for some functions ΠP (PP ) and ΠG (PG ). If so, we could could set PP = ΠP (PP )
and PG = ΠG (PG ), and replace the general budget constraint (2.15) with the simpler
form (2.14). In fact, the government consumption expenditure function is of the required
form, but the private consumption expenditure function is not; so we cannot use the
simpler budget constraint.
To show that the private consumption expenditure function cannot be written in
the form (2.16), we employ the general proposition (cf., e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer [1]
p. 143):
Proposition 1 For any demand system, the expenditure function is of the form
E(P, U ) = Π(P)F (U ) for some monotonic increasing function F if and only if the
system is homothetic.
Proof. For sufficiency, note that if the system is homothetic, there exists a strictly
increasing function F such that for all consumption vectors Q, for all positive K, F ◦
U (KQ) = KF ◦ U (Q). Let U0 be some arbitrary utility level; and for all price vectors
P, let Π(P) = E(P, U0 )/F (U0 ). Then for any utility level U1 and any price vector
P, E(P, U1 ) = Π(P)F (U1 ). For suppose that with prices P, consumption Q0 yields
utility U0 at minimum cost. Then consumption (F (U1 )/F (U0 ))Q0 yields utility U1
at minimum cost; so E(P, U1 ) = P • (F (U1 )/F (U0 ))Q0 = (F (U1 )/F (U0 ))E(P, U0 ) =
Π(P)F (U1 ). Hence the expenditure function is of the specified form. For necessity,
note that by Shephard’s lemma, the budget share of each commodity i is equal to the
elasticity of Π with respect to the price of i; so the budget shares are independent of
utility; so the system is homothetic.
Now as Hanoch [3] shows, the CDE is in general non-homothetic. Indeed, this is a
requirement for any empirically satisfactory demand system (see, for example, Deaton
and Muellbauer [1] p. 144), and part of the reason for adopting the CDE in GTAP
(Hertel and Tsigas [5], p. 49). So in GTAP, the private consumption expenditure
function is not of the form (2.16), and the budget constraint is not equation (2.14).
This shows that the old theory is defective, in that it contains an invalid derivation;
it does not show how or whether the relevant results are in error. An appendix discusses
how the defects in the theory relate to the Gorman conditions for two-stage budgeting
8

(appendix A). The main text proceeds to correct the theory (subsection 2.3) and
compare the corrected with the old results (subsection 2.4).

2.3

Revised theory

We find above (subsection 2.2) that we need to revise the budget constraint in the
upper-level demand system from the special form (2.14), PP UP + PG UG + PS US = X,
to the more general form (2.15), EP (PP , UP ) + EG (PG , UG ) + PS US = X. We now
derive the demand equations, an equation for utility, and some auxiliary equations
under this more general assumption.
As an aid to the reader, we distinguish these derived equations by enclosing them
in boxes .
We begin by obtaining a general solution for the Cobb-Douglas demand system in
the absence of fixed prices.
Proposition 2 In the Cobb-Douglas demand system
Y B
X
max U = C
Ui i subject to
Ei (Ui ) = X,
i

(2.17)

i

with expenditures Xi = Ei (Ui ) on individual commodities convex in quantities Ui , the
budget share
Φ−1 Bi
Xi
= P i −1 ,
(2.18)
X
j Φ j Bj

where Φi denotes the elasticity of expenditure on commodity i with respect to quantity of commodity i. In the corresponding cost minimization problem, the elasticity of
expenditure with respect to utility, Φ, is given by:
X
Φ−1 =
Φi−1 Bi .
(2.19)
i

Proof. The Lagrangean,
L=C

Y
i

UiBi

−Λ

Ã

X
i

Ei (Ui ) − X

!

,

where Λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Differentiating with respect to subutility i,
we obtain
Bi U
∂L
=
− ΛEi0 (Ui ).
(2.20)
0=
∂Ui
Ui
Also, by definition, the elasticity of expenditure on subutility i with respect to the
subutility level,
Ui Ei0 (Ui )
Φi =
.
(2.21)
Xi

9

Combining equations (2.20) and (2.21), we obtain
Xi =

Φ−1
i Bi U
.
Λ

(2.22)

Also total expenditure,
X=

X

Xi

(2.23)

i

Combining equations (2.22) and (2.23) and solving for Λ, we obtain
Λ=

U X −1
Φ i Bi .
X

(2.24)

i

Substituting from equation (2.24) into (2.22), we obtain the first required result, equation (2.18):
Φ−1 Bi
Xi
= P i −1 .
X
j Φ j Bj
Furthermore, by definition,

U 0
E (U ),
(2.25)
X
where E(U ) denotes the overall expenditure function (considered as a function of utility
only). Also, by the envelope theorem,
Φ=

Λ=

1
E 0 (U )

.

(2.26)

Combining equations (2.25), (2.26), and (2.24), we obtain the second required result,
equation (2.19):
X
Φ−1 =
Φ−1
i Bi .
i

Note that with expenditures proportional to quantities, the elasticities Φ i are unity,
so the equation reduces to the standard Cobb-Douglas fixed-shares equation. In general
however the expenditure shares are variable.
Now the government consumption demand system is Cobb-Douglas, so it is homothetic, so we can cardinalize utility from government consumption so that Φ G ≡ 1. Also
saving is a single commodity, so ΦS ≡ 1. Applying then proposition 2 to the GTAP

10

demand system, we have
µ
¶
ΦP −1
XP
BP ,
=
X
Φ
XG
= ΦBG ,
X
XS
= ΦBS ,
X
or, in percentage change form,
xP − x = −(φP − φ)

(2.27)

xG − x = φ

(2.28)

xS − x = φ

(2.29)

For percentage change in the utility elasticity of income, φ, we have
φ=

X
i

=

X Xi
i

=

Φ−1 Bi
P i −1 φi
j Φ j Bj

X

X

differentiating (2.19),

φi

substituting from (2.18),

S i φi

putting Si = Xi /X,

i

= S P φP + S G φG + S S φS .
Since φG = φS = 0, this reduces to
φ = S P φP

(2.30)

As we see from these equations, the utility elasticity of income, Φ, is a weighted
average of the lower-level utility elasticities ΦP , ΦG , and ΦS . Since ΦG and ΦS are fixed,
changes in Φ depend only on changes in the utility elasticity of private consumption
expenditure, ΦP . An increase in ΦP , a shift so to speak towards decreasing returns from
private consumption, leads to a budget reallocation away from private consumption
toward government consumption and saving.
We now develop an equation for changes in ΦP . As shown by Hanoch [3], with
the CDE form for the private consumption demand system, the utility elasticity is a
weighted average of the expansion parameters:
X
ΦP =
SiP Ri .
(2.31)
i

11

Differentiating, we obtain
φP =

X

SRi sP i

i

where SRi denotes the expansion-parameter-weighted budget share of commodity i,
S P Ri
S P Ri
SRi = P i P
.
= i
ΦP
j Sj Rj

(2.32)

Then writing pP i for the price of commodity i in private consumption, and uP i for per
capita private consumption of commodity i, we obtain
φP =

X

SRi (pP i + uP i − xP )

(2.33)

i

We see from this equation that shifts in private expenditure allocation toward commodities with high expansion parameters Ri tend to be associated with increases in
the private expenditure utility elasticity, while shifts towards commodities with low
expansion parameters tend to be associated with decreases.
For aggregate utility we use the general result:
Proposition 3 For the upper level of a weakly separable demand system,
X
max U (U1 , . . . , UG ) subject to
Ei (Pi , Ui ) = X,
i

where Ei (Pi , Ui ) denotes the expenditure function for the i’th lower-level demand system, we have
x = p + Φu,
where
p is an expenditure-share-weighted index of commodity group price indices, p =
P
S
p
i i i , where Si denotes the share of expenditure on group i in total expenditure,
Si = Xi /X,
pi is an expenditure-weighted index of prices of commodities in group
P and
i p , where S i denotes the share of commodity j from group i in total
i, pi =
S
ij
j
j j
expenditure on group i, Sji = Xij /Xi , where Xij denotes expenditure on commodity j
from group i, and pij denotes the price of commodity j from group i.
Proof. Define the Lagrangean
L = U (U1 , . . . , UG ) − Λ

Ã
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X
i

Ei (Pi , Ui ) − X

!

.

(2.34)

Then the elasticity of utility with respect to income,
∂ log U
X ∂L
=
∂ log X
U ∂X
X
= Λ
U
= Φ−1 ,

by the envelope theorem
differentiating (2.34)

and the elasticity of utility with respect to the price of the j’th commodity in the i’th
commodity group, that is, with respect to the j’th component of Pi ,
Pij ∂L
∂ log U
=
∂ log Pij
U ∂Pij
Pij ∂Xi
=−
Λ
U ∂Pij
Pij Qij
= −Λ
U
X Pij Qij
=− Λ
U
X
= −Φ−1 Sij ,

by the envelope theorem
differentiating (2.34)
by Shephard’s lemma

where Qij denotes consumption, and Sij the share in total expenditure, of commodity
j in commodity group i (for the envelope theorem see e.g. Varian [8]). Then totally
differentiating the indirect utility function, we have
X X ∂ log U
∂ log U
pij +
x
∂ log Pij
∂ log X
i
j
XX
−1
= −Φ
Sij pij + Φ−1 x

u=

i

=Φ

−1

j

(x − p),

where p is the expenditure-share-weighted index of commodity group price indices,
XX
p=
Sij pij
i

=

i

=

j

X X Xij
X

j

X

pij =

X Xi X Xij
X X
pij =
Si
Sji pij
X
Xi
i

j

i

S i pi ,

i

as in the statement of the proposition. Solving for x, we obtain
x = p + Φu,
as was to be shown.
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j

Moving from the general formulation of proposition 3 to the specific case of the
GTAP upper-level demand system, we copy the utility equation verbatim:
x = p + Φu

(2.35)

but write the disposition price index equation in the more specific form
p = S P pP + S G pG + S S pS

(2.36)

where pP and pG denote expenditure-weighted price indices for private and government
consumption, and pS denotes the price of saving.

2.4

Defects in the old treatment: assessment

Having identified an error in the derivation of the old theory (subsection 2.2), and
revised the theory to remove that defect (subsection 2.3), we now compare the results
of the revised theory with the original.
From equations (2.27)–(2.29), we see that under the revised theory, the upper-level
income disposition shares are not in general fixed. They are fixed in the special case
φ = φP = 0; from equation (2.30), this condition reduces to φP = 0; from equation (2.31), this is satisfied with fixed private consumption expenditure shares S iP or
uniform expansion parameters Ri ≡ R; that is, in the special case of a homothetic
system. In general however, the old top-level demand equations, which assume fixed
income disposition shares, are in error.
For utility, the old and new treatments use rather different approaches, so we cannot
directly compare the two equations. Instead we derive a new utility equation consistent
with the new theory but similar in approach to the old equation. We follow the old
derivation as far as equation (2.12),
u = BP uP + BG (qG − n) + BS (qS − n).
Then, instead of the old SP
new equai = Bi /B (from equations (2.4)–(2.6)), we use the P
−1
−1
−1
tion (2.18), Si = Φi Bi / j Φj Bj . From this and equation (2.19), Φ = i Φ−1
i Bi ,
we obtain
Φi
Si ,
Bi =
Φ
for i = P, G, S. Substituting into equation (2.12), and setting ΦG = ΦS = 1, we obtain
u = Φ−1 [ΦP SP uP + SG (qG − n) + SS (qS − n)].
Comparing this with the old utility equation (2.13),
Y u = YP uP + YG (qG − n) + YS (qS − n),
⇔

u = SP uP + SG (qG − n) + SS (qS − n),

(2.37)

we note that the old computation is invalid in general, but valid in the special case
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Φ = 1, ΦP = 1. As we now show, standard GTAP data bases fall within the special
case.
Proposition 4 Under the old treatment, the utility elasticity of income is equal to one
if and only if the expenditure-share-weighted sum of the CDE expansion parameters is
equal to one.
Proof. We have, from general theory, and from the treatment of saving and government
consumption,
uS = x S − p S ,
uG = x G − p G ,
uP = Φ−1
P (xP − pP ).
With the fixed-expenditure-shares upper-level demand equations in the old system, this
simplifies to
uS = x − p S ,
uG = x − p G ,
uP = Φ−1
P (x − pP ).
Then recalling equation (2.37), we have
u = SP uP + SG (qG − n) + SS (qS − n)
= S P uP + S G uG + S S uS
= Φ−1
P SP (x − pP ) + SG (x − pG ) + SS (x − pS ),
so the elasticity of income with respect to utility is
£

Φ−1
P SP + S G + S S

¤−1

,

which (assuming SP 6= 0) is equal to one if and only if ΦP = 1. But by equation (2.31),
ΦP is the expenditure-share-weighted sum of the CDE expansion parameters. So Φ = 1
if and only if the share-weighted sum of the CDE expansion parameters is equal to one;
as was to be shown.
In constructing standard GTAP data bases, we have normalized the expansion parameters so that their expenditure-share-weighted sum is indeed equal to one. Then,
from equation (2.31) and proposition 4, both the utility elasticity of private consumption expenditure and the utility elasticity of income are equal to one; so the old utility
equation is valid locally. Since however normalization is not a theoretical requirement of
the CDE, users may legitimately construct data bases with non-normalized parameters;
and with those data bases, the utility equation is invalid. Furthermore, in multi-step
simulations, initially normalized expansion parameters do not generally remain normalized; so even with initially normalized parameters, the utility equation is not exact.
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The old utility equation (2.37) then is exactly accurate in Johansen simulations
with data bases in which Φ = ΦP = 1 (including standard GTAP data bases); accurate
to first order in multi-step simulations with data bases in which Φ = ΦP = 1; and
inaccurate otherwise.
We note also that in GTAP simulations with the old treatment, the results for utility
are slightly wrong even in Johansen simulations with standard GTAP data bases. This is
because, although the utility equation itself is exact, the upper-level demand equations
are wrong. In practice however, with standard data bases, errors in the utility results
are likely to be small (see further section 5).

2.5

Possible remedies

There are several different approaches we might take to remedy the defects of the old
treatment.
1. We might retain the basic premises of the old treatment, in particular, the CDE
form for the private consumption demand system, while correcting the errors
in the derived equations, adopting the revised theory expounded above (subsection 2.3).
2. We might seek a new functional form for the private consumption demand system, that would allow us to retain fixed budget shares in the upper-level system.
Though it is not immediately obvious that such a form can be found, appendix B
shows that this approach is indeed feasible.
3. We might abandon the concept of an upper-level demand system. Rather than
representing the allocation of regional income as optimizing behavior by a fictitious
regional household, we might simply impose some arbitrary rule. There would
not necessarily be a concept of regional welfare, but instead a purely descriptive
treatment of macroeconomic behavior. This might be a simple rule such as the
fixed shares rule, or some more complex empirically motivated treatment.
Option (1) has the advantage of maximizing theoretical consistency with the old
treatment. Its disadvantage is that the upper-level demand equations become more
complex, so that the upper-level budget shares are no longer fixed. Options (2) and (3)
let us keep the fixed budget shares property, but require changes in the basic theory.
Option (3) also entails abandoning or radically revising the welfare measurement and
decomposition theory, one of the special strengths of the GTAP model.
In this paper we do not assess the relative merits of these approaches, but explore
only the most conservative approach, option (1). This provides part of the basis for
a broader assessment of the alternatives, and offers an interim solution pending that
assessment. The rest of this section is devoted to working out that interim solution.

2.6

A new treatment

We now develop a new treatment for the upper-level demand system. As discussed
above (subsection 2.5), we correct errors in the old theory without changing its basic
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premises. In particular, we retain the CDE form for the demand system for private
consumption.
We do change one minor feature of the old framework: we redefine utility from
government consumption, ug, as a per capita utility, so that it depends on per capita
rather than total government consumption. Since saving and utility from private consumption are already per capita variables, this change allows us to treat the entire
regional household demand system as the demand system of a representative regional
household, rather than as a conglomeration of demand systems of different households
(subsection 2.2).
To allow for exogenous shifts in the upper-level budget allocation, we treat the
Cobb-Douglas distribution parameters Bi as variables. This allows the model to simulate exogenous budget shifts within the demand system, rather than (as with the old
treatment) by overriding the demand system. With this addition, we use the revised
theory derived above (subsection 2.3).
We modify the module structure within the GTAP model source code, to bring
within the regional household module all equations derived from the upper level of the
final demand system, rather than leaving them scattered across the regional household,
government household, and investment and saving modules.

2.7

Shared variables

To implement the revised system, we first define some new cross-module variables. In
the new theory, the private consumption and regional household modules share the
levels coefficient ΦP for the elasticity of private consumption expenditure with respect
to utility from private consumption:
749
750
751

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UELASPRIV(r)
#elasticity of cost wrt utility from private consumption#;

the corresponding percentage variable φP :
480
481
482

Variable (all,r,REG)
uepriv(r)
#elasticity of cost wrt utility from private consumption#;

and pP , the private consumption price index:
477
478
479

Variable (all,r,REG)
ppriv(r)
#price index for private consumption expenditure in region r#;

The government consumption and regional household modules share the variable y G ,
government consumption expenditure:
472
473
474

Variable (all,r,REG)
yg(r)
#regional government consumption expenditure, in region r#;

Similarly, the saving and regional household modules share the variable yS , net saving:
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213
214

Variable (all,r,REG)
ysave(r) #net regional saving in region r#;

At the same time, the prices of composite commodities in government consumption,
pg, and the quantities of composite commodities consumed by government, qg, previously shared between the government and private consumption modules, become local
to the government consumption module.

2.8

Government consumption

Following the redefinition of utility UG from government consumption as a per capita
variable (subsection 2.6), we make the consequential changes in the government consumption module. Specifically, we revise the government consumption utility equation:
800
801
802
803

Equation GOVU
# utility from government consumption in r #
(all,r,REG)
yg(r) - pop(r) = pgov(r) + ug(r);

and the government consumption demand equation:
795
796
797
798

Equation GOVDMNDS
# government consumption demands for composite commodities (HT 41) #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
qg(i,r) - pop(r) = ug(r) - [pg(i,r) - pgov(r)];

Besides making these substantive changes, we remove all references to the government household from comments and labels in the source code.

2.9

Utility from private consumption

Within the private consumption module, we need new code for coefficients representing
the levels of three theoretical variables: the utility elasticity of private consumption
expenditure, the private consumption price index, and utility from private consumption.
To implement, we compute the level of the utility elasticity ΦP according to equation (2.31):
902
903

Formula (all,r,REG)
UELASPRIV(r) = sum{i,TRAD_COMM, CONSHR(i,r)*INCPAR(i,r)};

the expansion-parameter-weighted budget shares SRi according to equation (2.32):
920
921
922
923
924

Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
XWCONSHR(i,r)
#expansion-parameter-weighted consumption share#;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
XWCONSHR(i,r) = CONSHR(i,r)*INCPAR(i,r)/UELASPRIV(r);

and percentage change in the utility elasticity φP according to equation (2.33):
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926
927
928
929
930

Equation UTILELASPRIV
#elasticity of expenditure wrt utility from private consumption#
(all,r,REG)
uepriv(r)
= sum{i,TRAD_COMM, XWCONSHR(i,r)*[pp(i,r) + qp(i,r) - yp(r)]};

For utility from private consumption, we replace the (perfectly satisfactory) computation in the old code,
Equation PRIVATEU
# computation of utility from private consumption in r (HT 45) #
(all,r,REG)
yp(r)
= sum(i,TRAD_COMM, (CONSHR(i,r) * pp(i,r)))
+ sum(i,TRAD_COMM, (CONSHR(i,r) * INCPAR(i,r))) * up(r)
+ pop(r)
;

with a more readily interpretable computation based on the following general proposition:
Proposition 5 For a demand system,
max U (Q1 , . . . , QI ) subject to

X

Pi Qi = X,

i

we have
x = p + Φu,
where p is an expenditure-share-weighted index of commodity prices, p =

P

i pi .

Proof. This is a special case of proposition 3, where the lower-level demand systems each
cover just one commodity and the subutilities Ui are just the commodity consumption
quantities Qi .
Applying proposition 5 to utility from private consumption, we have
yP − n = p P + Φ P u P ,
where the price index for private consumption,
X
SiP pP i ,
pP =

(2.38)

(2.39)

i

We compute the private consumption price index pP according to equation (2.39):
905
906
907
908

Equation PHHLDINDEX
# price index for private consumption expenditure #
(all,r,REG)
ppriv(r) = sum{i,TRAD_COMM, CONSHR(i,r)*pp(i,r)};

and utility from private consumption according to equation (2.38):
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910
911
912
913

Equation PRIVATEU
# computation of utility from private consumption in r (HT 45) #
(all,r,REG)
yp(r) - pop(r) = ppriv(r) + UELASPRIV(r)*up(r);

2.10

Saving

In subsection 2.7, we introduced a new variable ysave representing the money value of
saving. In the saving module, we now add an equation relating it to the quantity of
saving:
1611
1612

Equation SAVEQUANT #quantity of saving# (all,r,REG)
ysave(r) = psave(r) + qsave(r);

The reason for adding the new variable and equation is to let users target the
money value of saving, just as they can target private and government consumption
expenditure.

2.11

Regional household preliminaries

Within the regional household module we revise the submodules for regional household
demands (subsection 2.12) and aggregate utility (subsection 2.13). We compute at
the outset some coefficients common to both submodules, the upper-level shares S i in
regional income, Si = Xi /X:
1980
1981
1982
1983

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRPRIV(r) #private expenditure share in regional income#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRPRIV(r) = PRIVEXP(r)/INCOME(r);

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRGOV(r) #government expenditure share in regional income#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRGOV(r) = GOVEXP(r)/INCOME(r);

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRSAVE(r) #saving share in regional income#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRSAVE(r) = SAVE(r)/INCOME(r);

We also declare some common variables: the distribution parameters bi from the toplevel demand equation:
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Variable (all,r,REG)
dppriv(r) #private consumption distribution parameter#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpgov(r) #government consumption distribution parameter#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpsave(r) #saving distribution parameter#;

and φ, the utility elasticity of income:
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1995
1996

Variable (all,r,REG)
uelas(r) #elasticity of cost of utility wrt utility#;

2.12

Regional household demands

We extend the revised theory (subsection 2.3) to treat the Cobb-Douglas distribution
parameters of the upper-level demand system as variables in the simultaneous equation
system. For the demand equations, we extend equations (2.27)–(2.29), and substitute
aggregate for per capita variables, obtaining
yP − y = −(φP − φ) + bP ,

(2.40)

yG − y = φ + b G ,

(2.41)

yS − y = φ + b S .

(2.42)

For the utility elasticity of income, φ, we extend equation (2.30), obtaining
φ = SP φP − bAV ,
where bAV denotes a weighted average of the distribution parameters,
X
bAV =
Si bi .

(2.43)

(2.44)

i

To implement this, we first declare the distribution parameters bi :
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Variable (all,r,REG)
dppriv(r) #private consumption distribution parameter#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpgov(r) #government consumption distribution parameter#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpsave(r) #saving distribution parameter#;

compute the weighted average of the distribution parameters according to equation (2.44):
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124

Variable (all,r,REG)
dpav(r) #average distribution parameter shift, for EV calc.#;
Equation DPARAV #average distribution parameter shift#
(all,r,REG)
dpav(r)
=
XSHRPRIV(r)*dppriv(r)
+ XSHRGOV(r)*dpgov(r)
+ XSHRSAVE(r)*dpsave(r)
;

and compute the utility elasticity of income according to equation (2.43):
2126
2127
2128

Equation UTILITELASTIC #elasticity of cost of utility wrt utility#
(all,r,REG)
uelas(r) = XSHRPRIV(r)*uepriv(r) - dpav(r);
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Finally we implement the regional household demand equations (2.40)–(2.42):
2130
2131

Equation PRIVCONSEXP #private consumption expenditure# (all,r,REG)
yp(r) - y(r) = -[uepriv(r) - uelas(r)] + dppriv(r);

2132
2133
2134

Equation GOVCONSEXP #government consumption expenditure# (all,r,REG)
yg(r) - y(r) = uelas(r) + dpgov(r);

2135
2136
2137

Equation SAVING #saving# (all,r,REG)
ysave(r) - y(r) = uelas(r) + dpsave(r);

2.13

Regional household utility

Now we compute utility for the regional household. Recalling the levels equation (2.17),
Y B
U =C
Ui i ,
i

we extend the differential equation (2.35) to treat the scaling factor C and the distribution parameters Bi as variable, obtaining
X
u=c+
Bi (log Ui )bi + Φ−1 (x − p).
(2.45)
i

We remark that the initial settings of log Ui are arbitrary, in that they are not
constrained by the observed state of the economy as recorded in the data base, and do
not affect the positive properties of the demand system. They affect only the sensitivity
of utility to changes in preferences. Once the initial settings have been made however,
theory dictates how the coefficients should be updated. By adjusting the settings of
log Ui , we can make utility increasing in the distribution parameters, decreasing, or
locally invariant. We can also make it increasing with respect to some of the distribution
parameters and decreasing with respect to others.
The requirements for implementing distribution terms in the equation are somewhat
onerous, in that we need to store and update both the distribution parameters B i
and the quantities Ui —even though these are not required for any positive variables.
Given all this, and the doubtful meaningfulness of utility comparisons in the presence
of preference changes, it may seem hardly worthwhile incorporating the distribution
parameters into the utility equation. Yet we attach some importance to it. Some
important macro closures involve exogenizing the balance of trade and endogenizing a
distributional variable. It would be an inconvenience when using these closures to forego
results for utility and equivalent variation and the welfare decomposition. Moreover it
seems that most of the welfare analysis should be just as meaningful with an exogenous
as with an endogenous trade balance.
Since we must have the distributional parameters but do not welcome their welfare
effects, we do what we can to minimize them. We choose initial parameter values
so that, in small change simulations, changes in the distributional parameters do not
affect utility (subsection 2.15). And we provide, in connection with the measurement
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of equivalent variation, a mechanism for minimizing the welfare effects of distributional
parameter changes in large-change simulations (subsection 3.8).
To implement equation (2.45), we first declare as percentage change variables utility
u:
2146
2147

Variable (all,r,REG)
u(r) #per capita utility from aggregate hhld expend., in region r#;

and the constant c in the utility function:
2148
2149

Variable (all,r,REG)
au(r) #input-neutral shift in utility function#;

We need next the levels values of the distributional parameters Bi . From equations
(2.18) and (2.19), we find that we can calculate them as
Bi =

Φi Si
,
Φ

(2.46)

given the levels value of the utility elasticity Φ. The theory however does not determine
the levels value of Φ. We could store Φ in the data base, but it is slightly
more
P
convenient to store instead the sum of the distribution parameters, B = i Bi ; since
when the utility elasticity of private consumption expenditure, ΦP , is non-unitary, it
is more natural to take B than Φ as unitary, leaving the other coefficient to take a
non-obvious calculated value. From equation (2.46), we obtain the formula giving Φ in
terms of given B:
P
Si Φi
Φ= i
.
(2.47)
B
To calculate the sum B of the distribution parameter in updated databases, we use
the corresponding percentage change variable b. We declare this variable:
2150
2151

Variable (all,r,REG)
dpsum(r) #sum of the distribution parameters#;

and define the corresponding levels coefficient:
2153
2154
2155
2156
2157
2158

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
DPARSUM(r) #sum of distribution parameters#;
Read
DPARSUM from file GTAPDATA header "DPS";
Update (all,r,REG)
DPARSUM(r) = dpsum(r);

This lets us define the level Φ of the utility elasticity of expenditure, according to
equation (2.47):
2160
2161
2162
2163
2164

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILELAS(r) #elasticity of cost of utility wrt utility#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
UTILELAS(r)
= [UELASPRIV(r)*XSHRPRIV(r) + XSHRGOV(r) + XSHRSAVE(r)]/DPARSUM(r);
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We define the levels coefficients Bi for the distribution parameters using equation (2.46):
2166
2167
2168
2169

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
DPARPRIV(r) #private consumption distribution parameter#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
DPARPRIV(r) = UELASPRIV(r)*XSHRPRIV(r)/UTILELAS(r);

2170
2171
2172
2173
2174

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
DPARGOV(r) #government consumption distribution parameter#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
DPARGOV(r) = XSHRGOV(r)/UTILELAS(r);

2175
2176
2177
2178
2179

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
DPARSAVE(r) #saving distribution parameter#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
DPARSAVE(r) = XSHRSAVE(r)/UTILELAS(r);

We define also the levels coefficients Ui for the goods in the top-level utility function:
2181
2182
2183
2184
2185
2186

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILPRIV(r) #utility from private consumption#;
Read
UTILPRIV from file GTAPDATA header "UP";
Update (all,r,REG)
UTILPRIV(r) = up(r);

2187
2188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILGOV(r) #utility from government consumption#;
Read
UTILGOV from file GTAPDATA header "UG";
Update (all,r,REG)
UTILGOV(r) = ug(r);

2194
2195
2196
2197
2198
2199
2200

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILSAVE(r) #utility from saving#;
Read
UTILSAVE from file GTAPDATA header "US";
Update (change) (all,r,REG)
UTILSAVE(r) = [1.0/100.0]*[qsave(r) - pop(r)]*UTILSAVE(r);

We compute the outlays price index p according to equation (2.36):
2202
2203
2204
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
2210
2211

Variable (all,r,REG)
p(r) #price index for disposition of income by regional household#;
Equation PRICEINDEXREG
#price index for disposition of income by regional household#
(all,r,REG)
p(r)
=
XSHRPRIV(r)*ppriv(r)
+ XSHRGOV(r)*pgov(r)
+ XSHRSAVE(r)*psave(r)
;
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After all these preliminaries, we compute regional household utility u, according to
equation (2.35):
2213
2214
2215
2216
2217
2218

Equation UTILITY #regional household utility# (all,r,REG)
u(r) = au(r)
+ DPARPRIV(r)*loge(UTILPRIV(r))*dppriv(r)
+ DPARGOV(r)*loge(UTILGOV(r))*dpgov(r)
+ DPARSAVE(r)*loge(UTILSAVE(r))*dpsave(r)
+ [1.0/UTILELAS(r)]*[y(r) - pop(r) - p(r)];

One task remains, to determine the variable dpsum used to update the coefficient
DPARSUM:
2220
2221
2222

Equation DISTPARSUM #sum of the distribution parameters# (all,r,REG)
DPARSUM(r)*dpsum(r)
= DPARPRIV(r)*dppriv(r) + DPARGOV(r)*dpgov(r) + DPARSAVE(r)*dpsave(r);

2.14

Shifting income allocation without affecting the utility elasticity

As described in subsection 2.13, the new treatment minimizes the effects of changes in
the distribution parameters on the current level of utility in simulations with standard
GTAP data bases. We now describe a mechanism through which users can adjust the
distributional parameters without affecting the utility elasticity of income. This helps
to make utility results easier to interpret.
Suppose for example that we wish to fix expenditure on government consumption,
yG , and to that end exogenize it and endogenize the corresponding distribution parameter BG . Then depending on changes in real income, the distribution parameter may
either rise or fall; and depending on whether it rises or falls, the utility elasticity of
income rises or falls. If it rises, then a large change in real income may generate a
small change in utility; if it falls, then a small change in real income may generate a
large change in utility. Since the direction of change in the utility elasticity is just a
side-effect of fixing yG , the magnitude of the utility change is somewhat arbitrary.
We avoid this by introducing a group of shift variables to drive the distribution
parameters. They include both shifters specific to individual distribution parameters
and a shifter common to all of them. From equation (2.43),
φ = SP φP − bAV ,
we note that the effect of the distribution parameters on the utility elasticity is encapsulated in the average of the distribution parameters, bAV . So we can neutralize
the effects of shocks in the specific shifters by endogenizing the common shifter and
exogenizing bAV (dpav).
Accordingly, we write each distribution parameter as the product of a specific and
the generic scaling factor:
2097
2098
2099

Variable (all,r,REG)
dpfpriv(r) #private-consumption-specific distparam shift#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
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2100
2101
2102
2103
2104

dpfgov(r) #government-consumption-specific distparam shift#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpfsave(r) #saving-specific distparam shift#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
dpshift(r) #generic distparam shift#;

2105
2106
2107
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114

Equation DISTPARPRIV #private consumption distribution parameter#
(all,r,REG)
dppriv(r) = dpfpriv(r) + dpshift(r);
Equation DISTPARGOV #government consumption distribution parameter#
(all,r,REG)
dpgov(r) = dpfgov(r) + dpshift(r);
Equation DISTPARSAVE #saving distribution parameter#
(all,r,REG)
dpsave(r) = dpfsave(r) + dpshift(r);

In the usual case, the distributional parameters are fixed, with
exogenous dpfpriv, dpfgov, dpfsave, dpshift;
endogenous dppriv, dpgov, dpsave, dpav.
Suppose however that the user wants to fix (or shock) government consumption expenditure, yg. She can do this by setting yg exogenous, and:
exogenous dpfpriv, dpfsave, dpshift;
endogenous dpfgov, dppriv, dpgov, dpsave, dpav.
If however she wishes to neutralize the effect of the distributional parameter shift on
the utility elasticity of income, she may set:
exogenous dpfpriv, dpfsave, dpav;
endogenous dpfgov, dpshift, dppriv, dpgov, dpsave.

2.15

Changes to the data file

As described in subsection 2.13, we read a new coefficient DPARSUM from the data file.
To do this we need a new data file array DPS, with dimension REG. The new array
records, for each region, the sum of the distribution parameters.
The setting of this parameter has no effect on the positive variables in the model,
nor on the equivalent variation, but through the top-level utility elasticity UTILELAS
it does affect regional utility u. We set it initially at 1 in each region; changes in the
distribution parameters dppriv, dpgov, and dpsave may affect its value in updated
data bases.
In standard data bases, with both UTILELASPRIV and DPSUM set equal to 1, the
utility elasticity UTILELAS of generalized expenditure is equal to 1. This means that
initially, a one per cent change in regional income translates into a one per cent change
in regional utility.
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We also set values for three region-dimension arrays representing levels for the commodities in the top level of the regional demand system: utility from private consumption, UP; utility from government consumption, UG; and saving, Q. We set these all to zero
to ensure that with the standard data base, changes in the distributional parameters
have no first-order effect on utility (subsection 2.13).

3

Equivalent variation

The old demand system having been found defective and revised, it is natural to review
the treatment of the equivalent variation. As it turns it, this too is defective, but its
defects are largely independent of those of the demand system. In the remainder of this
section we derive the old treatment (subsection 3.1), assess its defects (subsection 3.2),
develop a new treatment (subsection 3.3), and implement it (subsections 3.5–3.9).
By definition, the equivalent variation (EV ),
EV = YEV − Ȳ ,
where YEV denotes regional income required to achieve current utility at initial prices,
and Ȳ denotes initial regional income. Differentiating, we obtain:
d EV =

1
YEV yEV .
100

(3.1)

This equation provides a starting point for both the old and new treatments.

3.1

The old treatment

In the old treatment, EV is computed according to the equation
Equation EVREG
# regional EV, the money metric welfare change (HT 67) #
(all,r,REG)
EV(r)
= [REGEXP(r)/100]*[URATIO(r)*POPRATIO(r)]*[u(r) + pop(r)];

In mathematical notation, we may write this as
d EV =

1
Ȳ UR NR (n + u),
100

(3.2)

where UR = U/Ū is the ratio of current to initial utility, NR = N/N̄ the ratio of current
to initial population, and n the percentage change in population. This equation is not
covered in the original GTAP documentation (Hertel and Tsigas [5]), having been added
after that was written. We now provide a derivation, in order to explore the conditions
under which the equation is valid.
Proposition 6 Equation (3.2) is a valid first-order approximation for small changes
in U , provided that initially the utility elasticity of income, Φ, is equal to one.
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Proof. Recall equation (3.1),
d EV =

1
YEV yEV .
100

Now
yEV = n + xEV ,
where xEV denotes percentage change in per capita expenditure required to achieve
current utility at initial prices. Also, setting the price index p equal to zero in equation (2.35), we have
xEV = ΦEV u,
(3.3)
where ΦEV denotes the utility elasticity of income, evaluated at current utility and
initial prices. So
yEV = n + ΦEV u,
(3.4)
and

1
YEV (n + ΦEV u).
100
Although this equation is suitable for implementation, it does not lead directly to
the GTAP 4.1 equation (3.2). To derive that we need to replace YEV with an expression
involving Ȳ . Now
YEV = N XEV = NR N̄ XEV ,
d EV =

where XEV denotes per capita expenditure required to achieve current utility at initial
prices P̄; and
XEV = URΦARC X̄,
where ΦARC denotes the arc elasticity of income with respect to utility along the arc
between (P̄, Ū ) and (P̄, U ); so
YEV = NR URΦARC N̄ X̄
= NR URΦARC Ȳ ,
and

1
NR URΦARC Ȳ (n + ΦEV u).
100
Suppose that initially Φ is equal to one. Then ΦEV also is initially equal to one,
since ΦEV is initially equal to Φ. So, by continuity, ΦEV is arbitrarily close to one for
sufficiently small changes in U . Also, by the mean value theorem, ΦARC is arbitrarily
close to the initial value of Φ, one, for sufficiently small changes in U . So, to a first-order
approximation,
1
d EV ≈
NR UR Ȳ (n + u),
100
as was to be shown.
d EV =
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3.2

Defects in the old treatment

As shown above (subsection 3.1), the old computation of EV is not exact, but is a
valid approximation when the utility elasticity of income Φ is equal to one. Recalling
proposition 4, we note that the condition is satisfied in standard GTAP data bases.
Much like the old utility equation then (subsection 2.4), the EV equation is exactly
accurate in Johansen simulations with data bases in which Φ = 1 (including standard
GTAP data bases); accurate to first order in multi-step simulations with data bases in
which Φ = 1; and inaccurate otherwise.
While the old treatment works well for standard GTAP data bases and small utility
changes, a treatment that works well with non-standard data bases and large changes
would of course be even better. This we now develop.

3.3

A new treatment

We seek a new formula for the equivalent variation that does not assume a unit elasticity
of income with respect to utility, and is consistent with the new implementation of the
regional household demand system.
We cannot implement equation (3.1) for EV directly, since we do not have an explicit
functional form for the regional household expenditure function. Indeed, we do not have
an explicit functional form even for the private consumption expenditure function. We
can however compute the expenditure function indirectly, by implementing the demand
system and solving for expenditure Y given utility U . It is then easy to compute EV .
The regional demand system already present in the model gives the relation between
expenditure Y , current utility U , and current prices P. To find the expenditure YEV
required to achieve current utility U at initial prices P̄, we implement a shadow demand
system with the same utility level as the ordinary system, but with prices held at initial
levels. The expenditure level in this shadow system is just the YEV required to calculate
EV .
Recalling the equation (3.3) for percentage change in equivalent income, x EV =
ΦEV u, we see that we can compute equivalent income provided that we track Φ EV , the
utility elasticity evaluated at current utility and initial prices. To track ΦEV we need
to compute the corresponding percentage change variable φEV . To do that we need
to include in the shadow system most of the upper-level regional household demand
system.
Furthermore, as shown by equation (2.43), φ = SP φP − bAV , the regional household
elasticity φ depends on the private consumption elasticity φP . To compute that elasticity, we need to include part of the private consumption demand system. The private
consumption demand system also supplies to the top level system the change variable
uP for utility from private consumption required to update the levels coefficient UP
used in the top-level utility equation. Similarly the top-level demand system requires a
variable uG to be supplied from a government consumption demand system. Altogether
then the shadow demand system includes four parts: a government consumption demand system, a private consumption demand system, an upper-level regional household
demand system, and equations relating income to the equivalent variation.

29

3.4

Equivalent variation with preference change

So far we have not considered the effect of preference change on the equivalent variation.
When the top level distribution parameters Bi or the scaling constant C change, should
we calculate the equivalent variation at initial preferences or at final preferences, or
should we include the effects of the preference change in the equivalent variation?
Extending our earlier notation, we may write E(P, U ; A) for the generalized expenditure function evaluated at prices P, utility U , and preferences A. Initial income, Ȳ ,
is equal to E(P̄, Ū ; Ā), that is, to the expenditure function evaluated at initial prices,
utility, and preferences. If we calculate the equivalent variation at initial preferences,
then
EV = E(P̄, U ; Ā) − E(P̄, Ū ; Ā);
(3.5)
if we calculate it at final preferences, then
EV = E(P̄, U ; A) − E(P̄, Ū ; A);

(3.6)

if we include preference change in the equivalent variation, then
EV = E(P̄, U ; A) − E(P̄, Ū ; Ā).

(3.7)

Standard theory offers no guidance here, since it considers the equivalent variation
only with constant preferences. In chosing between the measures, we prefer to minimize
the effects of distribution parameter changes on the equivalent variation. One might
guess that the way to do this is to adopt one of the measures that holds the distribution
parameters constant; but in fact, a little reflection shows that the opposite is the case,
and that we should adopt the measure that incorporates the preference changes.
Suppose, to take a simple example, that there is an increase in the scaling constant
C, with income and prices constant. Then utility increases, so the region needs more
income to obtain the initial level of utility with the old scaling constant, and measure
(3.5) of the equivalent variation is strictly positive; and likewise the region can get the
old utility level more cheaply with the new scaling constant, so measure (3.6) is also
strictly positive; but with measure (3.7), the increase in utility and the change in the
scaling constant offset each other. More precisely, it is easy to show that with measure
(3.7):
• the effect on the equivalent variation of a change in the scaling constant C is
exactly zero;
• the effect of a change in the distribution parameters Bi , unaccompanied by
changes in prices, through the demand system on the equivalent variation, is
exactly zero (of course, there may be general equilbrium effects);
• the effect of a change in the distribution parameters Bi , whether or not accompanied by changes in prices, through the demand system on the equivalent variation,
is zero in a linearized model solution.
(See further subsection 4.3 and equation 4.5.)
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Accordingly, we adopt measure (3.7), defining the equivalent variation to include
changes in preferences.

3.5

Shared objects

We begin by declaring the coefficients and variables that the EV module contributes to
the rest of the model. The module’s primary function is to compute the regional and
world-wide equivalent variations:
2569
2570
2571
2572

Variable (Change)(all,r,REG)
EV(r) #equivalent variation, $ US million#;
Variable (Change)
WEV #equivalent variation for the world#;

But it also contributes several coefficients needed for the EV decomposition (section 4):
the utility elasticity of generalized expenditure ΦEV in the EV shadow system:
2574
2575
2576

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILELASEV(r)
#utility elasticity of generalized expenditure, for EV calcs#;

and the quantities Ui of the goods in the shadow top-level demand system:
2578
2579

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILPRIVEV(r) #utility from private consumption, for EV calcs#;

2580
2581
2582

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILGOVEV(r) #utility from private consumption, for EV calcs#;

2583
2584
2585

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UTILSAVEEV(r) #utility from private consumption, for EV calcs#;

Finally we declare several variables shared between different parts of the EV module. The government consumption shadow demand system computes utility from government consumption, ugev, for use in the upper-level shadow demand system. The
private consumption shadow demand system computes utility from private consumption, upev, and the elasticity of private consumption expenditure with respect to utility
from private consumption, ueprivev, for use in the shadow upper-level demand system.
The shadow upper-level demand system computes government consumption expenditure, ygev, for use in the shadow government consumption demand system; private
consumption expenditure, ypev, for use in the shadow private consumption demand
system; and equivalent income, yev and INCOMEEV, for use in the equivalent variation
calculation:
2593
2594
2595
2596
2597
2598

Variable (all,r,REG)
ugev(r) #per capita utility from gov’t expend., shadow#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
upev(r) #per capita utility from private expend., shadow#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
ueprivev(r)
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2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
2604
2605
2606
2607

#utility elasticity of private consn expenditure, shadow#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
ygev(r)
#government consumption expenditure, in region r, shadow#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
ypev(r)
#private consumption expenditure, in region r, shadow#;
Variable (all,r,REG)
yev(r) #equivalent income, for EV#;

2608
2609
2610

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
INCOMEEV(r) #equivalent income, for EV#;

3.6

The shadow government consumption demand system

The task of the shadow government consumption demand system is to compute shadow
values for the change variable uG for utility from government consumption. It contains
just one equation, a simplified version of the equation from the ordinary government
consumption module (subsection 2.8) relating utility from government consumption to
government consumption expenditure, with the price variable omitted:
2618
2619
2620
2621

Equation GOVUEV
# utility from government consumption in r #
(all,r,REG)
ygev(r) - pop(r) = ugev(r);

3.7

The shadow private consumption demand system

The task of the shadow private consumption demand system is to compute shadow
values for the change variables uP for utility from private consumption, and φP for
the elasticity of private consumption expenditure with respect to utility from private
consumption.
Recalling equation (2.33), we have, with fixed prices,
X
φP =
SRi (uP i − xP ),
(3.8)
i

where SRi denotes the expansion-parameter-weighted budget share, Si Ri /ΦP , of commodity i in the shadow private consumption demand system. So to compute the shadow
elasticity, we need shadow system values for the budget shares SRi and the private consumption demands uP i . To compute the private consumption demands we need the
expenditure elasticities, and to compute them and the expansion-parameter-weighted
budget shares, we need the ordinary budget shares. To compute the ordinary budget shares, we need to record shadow private consumption expenditures for individual
composite commodities.
We implement as a shadow system as much of the private consumption demand
system as we need to compute the shadow private consumption budget shares. Since
the shadow system uses the same theory as the ordinary private consumption demand
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system, we do not provide derivations, but instead refer the reader to the original
documentation (Hertel and Tsigas [5]).
We begin by declaring the shadow private consumption demand variable:
2629
2630
2631

Variable (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
qpev(i,r)
#private hhld demand for commodity i in region r, shadow#;

We then define the shadow private consumption expenditure levels:
2633
2634
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639

Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
VPAEV(i,r)
#private hhld expend. on i in r valued at agent’s prices, shadow#;
Formula (initial) (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
VPAEV(i,r) = VPA(i,r);
Update (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
VPAEV(i,r) = qpev(i,r);

and the shadow private consumption budget shares:
2641
2642
2643
2644

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
VPAREGEV(r) #private consumption expenditure in region r, shadow#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
VPAREGEV(r) = sum{i,TRAD_COMM, VPAEV(i,r)};

2645
2646
2647
2648
2649
2650

Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
CONSHREV(i,r)
#share of private hhld consn devoted to good i in r, shadow#;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
CONSHREV(i,r) = VPAEV(i,r)/VPAREGEV(r);

We compute the expenditure elasticities as in the ordinary demand system, but
using the shadow budget shares CONSHREV instead of the ordinary shares CONSHR:
2653
2654
2655
2656
2657
2658
2659
2660
2661
2662
2663
2664
2665

Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
EYEV(i,r)
#expend. elast. of private hhld demand for i in r, shadow#;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
EYEV(i,r)
=
[1.0/[sum{n, TRAD_COMM, CONSHREV(n,r)*INCPAR(n,r)}]]
* [
INCPAR(i,r)*[1.0 - ALPHA(i,r)]
+ sum{n, TRAD_COMM, CONSHREV(n,r)*INCPAR(n,r)*ALPHA(n,r)}
]
+ ALPHA(i,r)
- sum{n, TRAD_COMM, CONSHREV(n,r) * ALPHA(n,r)}
;

We can now compute the shadow private consumption demands, required as shown
above to update the levels coefficients for private consumption expenditure:
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2667
2668
2669
2670

Equation PRIVDMNDSEV
#private hhld demands for composite commodities, shadow#
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
qpev(i,r) - pop(r) = EYEV(i,r)*[ypev(r) - pop(r)];

Next we compute the utility elasticity ΦP of private consumption expenditure:
2672
2673
2674
2675
2676

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
UELASPRIVEV(r)
#elast. of cost wrt utility from private consn, shadow#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
UELASPRIVEV(r) = sum{i,TRAD_COMM, CONSHREV(i,r)*INCPAR(i,r)};

This appears both in the equation for utility uP from private consumption, a simplified
version of equation (2.38):
2678
2679
2680
2681

Equation PRIVATEUEV
# computation of utility from private consumption in r (HT 45) #
(all,r,REG)
ypev(r) - pop(r) = UELASPRIVEV(r)*upev(r);

and as the denominator in the formula for the expansion-parameter-weighted budget
shares SRi :
2683
2684
2685
2686
2687

Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
XWCONSHREV(i,r)
#expansion-parameter-weighted consumption share, shadow#;
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
XWCONSHREV(i,r) = CONSHREV(i,r)*INCPAR(i,r)/UELASPRIVEV(r);

With these shares, as shown in equation (3.8), we compute the change variable φ P for
the utility elasticity of private consumption expenditure:
2689
2690
2691
2692
2693

Equation UTILELASPRIVEV
#elasticity of cost wrt utility from private consn, shadow#
(all,r,REG)
ueprivev(r)
= sum{i,TRAD_COMM, XWCONSHREV(i,r)*[qpev(i,r) - ypev(r)]};

3.8

The shadow upper-level regional household demand system

The tasks of the shadow upper-level regional household demand system are to compute
shadow income and shadow private consumption expenditure, given utility. To compute
shadow income, it tracks the elasticity ΦEV of shadow income with
P respect to utility.
Recalling equations (2.43), φ = SP φP − bAV , and (2.44), bAV = i Si bi , we see that
it must also compute shadow values for the upper level income disposition shares S i ,
i = P, G, S. That in turn requires shadow values for the upper-level components of
income disposition, YP , YG , and YS ; and those, shadow results for the related percentage
change variables yP , yG , and qS .
We begin by declaring a change variable for change in real saving:
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2702
2703

Variable (all,r,REG)
qsaveev(r) #regional demand for NET saving, shadow#;

We then compute the level of income in the shadow system:
2705
2706
2707
2708

Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
INCOMEEV(r) = INCOME(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
INCOMEEV(r) = yev(r);

levels for the upper-level components of income disposition:
2710
2711
2712
2713
2714
2715
2716
2717

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
PRIVEXPEV(r)
#private consumption expenditure in region r, shadow#;
Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
PRIVEXPEV(r) = PRIVEXP(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
PRIVEXPEV(r) = ypev(r);
!< PRIVEXPEV should agree with VPAREGEV.>!

2718
2719
2720
2721
2722
2723
2724
2725

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
GOVEXPEV(r)
#government consumption expenditure in region r, shadow#;
Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
GOVEXPEV(r) = GOVEXP(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
GOVEXPEV(r) = ygev(r);

2726
2727
2728
2729
2730
2731
2732

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
SAVEEV(r) #saving in region r, shadow#;
Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
SAVEEV(r) = SAVE(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
SAVEEV(r) = qsaveev(r);

and upper-level income disposition shares:
2734
2735
2736
2737
2738

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRPRIVEV(r)
#private expenditure share in regional income, shadow#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRPRIVEV(r) = PRIVEXPEV(r)/INCOMEEV(r);

2739
2740
2741
2742
2743
2744

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRGOVEV(r)
#government expenditure share in regional income, shadow#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRGOVEV(r) = GOVEXPEV(r)/INCOMEEV(r);

2745
2746
2747

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
XSHRSAVEEV(r) #saving share in regional income, shadow#;
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2748
2749

Formula (all,r,REG)
XSHRSAVEEV(r) = SAVEEV(r)/INCOMEEV(r);

This enables us to compute the weighted average of the distribution parameters, following equation (2.44):
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
2756
2757
2758
2759

Variable (all,r,REG)
dpavev(r) #average distribution parameter shift, shadow#;
Equation DPARAVEV #average distribution parameter shift, shadow#
(all,r,REG)
dpavev(r)
=
XSHRPRIVEV(r)*dppriv(r)
+ XSHRGOVEV(r)*dpgov(r)
+ XSHRSAVEEV(r)*dpsave(r)
;

and the utility elasticity of income, following equation (2.43):
2761
2762
2763
2764
2765
2766
2767

Variable (all,r,REG)
uelasev(r)
#elasticity of cost of utility wrt utility, shadow#;
Equation UTILITELASTICEV
#elasticity of cost of utility wrt utility, shadow#
(all,r,REG)
uelasev(r) = XSHRPRIV(r)*ueprivev(r) - dpavev(r);

This in turn enables us to implement the upper-level demand equations, following equations (2.40)–(2.42):
2769
2770
2771

Equation PCONSEXPEV #private consumption expenditure, shadow#
(all,r,REG)
ypev(r) - yev(r) = -[ueprivev(r) - uelasev(r)] + dppriv(r);

2772
2773
2774
2775

Equation GOVCONSEXPEV #government consumption expenditure#
(all,r,REG)
ygev(r) - yev(r) = uelasev(r) + dpgov(r);

2776
2777
2778

Equation SAVINGEV #saving# (all,r,REG)
qsaveev(r) - yev(r) = uelasev(r) + dpsave(r);

and to compute the level of the utility elasticity of income:
2780
2781
2782
2783

Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
UTILELASEV(r) = UTILELAS(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
UTILELASEV(r) = uelasev(r);

We also define levels coefficients for the goods in the top-level utility function:
2785
2786
2787

Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
UTILPRIVEV(r) = UTILPRIV(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
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UTILPRIVEV(r) = upev(r);

2788
2789
2790
2791
2792
2793

Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
UTILGOVEV(r) = UTILGOV(r);
Update (all,r,REG)
UTILGOVEV(r) = ugev(r);

2794
2795
2796
2797
2798

Formula (initial) (all,r,REG)
UTILSAVEEV(r) = UTILSAVE(r);
Update (change) (all,r,REG)
UTILSAVEEV(r) = [1.0/100.0]*[qsaveev(r) - pop(r)]*UTILSAVEEV(r);

Finally we compute the percentage change in shadow income, following equation (2.45):
2800
2801
2802
2803
2804
2805

Equation INCOME_SHAD #shadow income# (all,r,REG)
u(r) = au(r)
+ DPARPRIV(r)*loge(UTILPRIVEV(r))*dppriv(r)
+ DPARGOV(r)*loge(UTILGOVEV(r))*dpgov(r)
+ DPARSAVE(r)*loge(UTILSAVEEV(r))*dpsave(r)
+ [1.0/UTILELASEV(r)]*[yev(r) - pop(r)];

3.9

Computing the equivalent variation

Implementing equation (3.1), we compute regional equivalent variation EV :
2813
2814

Equation EVREG #regional EV (HT 67)# (all,r,REG)
EV(r) = [INCOMEEV(r)/100.0]*yev(r);

We also compute a world equivalent variation, WEV, as the sum of the regional equivalent
variations:
2816
2817

Equation EVWLD #EV for the world (HT 68)#
WEV = sum{r, REG, EV(r)};

4

Decomposing the equivalent variation

We describe the old decomposition of the equivalent variation (subsection 4.1), discuss
its defects (subsection 4.2), and derive (subsection 4.3, 4.4) and implement (subsection 4.5) a new decomposition.
In the derivations below, we derive each EV decomposition formula from two simpler
formulae: a lengthy formula decomposing some income-related variable, such as real
income or real per capita income, and a decomposition scheme relating the income
variable to EV . Substituting the decomposition of the income-related variable into the
decomposition scheme yields the full EV decomposition.

4.1

The old treatment

The old derivation (Huff and Hertel [6]) uses a decomposition of real income,
D = Y (y − p),
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(4.1)

where D stands for a rather lengthy decomposition (reproduced with minor changes in
subsection 4.3) of real regional income into components related to factor endowments,
technological change, allocative efficiency, and terms of trade. The relation between
real income and EV is given by the decomposition scheme
"
Ã
! #
X
1
Ȳ
UR N R
D−
(4.2)
d EV =
YP i (Ri − 1) uP ,
100
Y
i

where YP i denotes private consumption expenditure on commodity i.
The problems with the old decomposition relate not to the real income decomposition but to the decomposition scheme. Accordingly, we do not derive here the real
income decomposition, but refer the reader to the original documentation. We do provide a new derivation for the decomposition scheme, in order to identify sources of error
in the old decomposition, and also to explain why the old decomposition is consistent
with the old computation of EV .
We use the old utility equation (2.37),
û = SP uP + SG (qG − n) + SS (qS − n).

(4.3)

We recall (from subsection 2.4) that the old computation is invalid in general, but valid
in the special case Φ = 1, ΦP = 1, and that standard GTAP data bases fall within the
special case. We use for this derivation the notation û for utility computed according
to equation (4.3).
Recalling equations (2.10) and (2.11), and dropping the government consumption
and saving slack variables κG and κS , we have
qG = y − p G ,
qS = y − p S .
Also, from equation (2.38), we have ΦP uP = yP − n − pP . Adding uP − ΦP uP to
both sides, and putting y for yP (consistent with the old treatment provided the slack
variables are zero), we obtain
uP = y − n − pP − (ΦP − 1)uP .
Substituting into equation (4.3), we obtain
û = y − n − (SP pP + SG pG + SS pS ) − SP (ΦP − 1)uP .
Then substituting from equation (2.36), p = SP pP + SG pG + SS pS , we obtain
û = y − n − p − SP (ΦP − 1)uP .
Substituting into the old EV equation (3.2), d EV = (1/100)UR NR Ȳ (n + û), we obtain
d EV =

1
UR NR Ȳ [y − p − SP (ΦP − 1)uP ].
100
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Substituting for D from equation (4.1), we obtain
Ȳ
1
UR NR [D − YP (ΦP − 1)uP ].
100
Y
P
Substituting for ΦP from equation (2.31), ΦP = i SiP Ri , we obtain finally the old EV
decomposition scheme,
"
Ã
! #
X
Ȳ
1
d EV =
UR N R
D−
YP i (Ri − 1) uP .
100
Y
d EV =

i

4.2

Defects in the old treatment

The old welfare decomposition has two defects: it contains a nuisance term, the term
in uP in equation (4.2); and it is in general invalid.
As shown in subsection 3.1, the old decomposition relies on the old utility equation (4.3), and inherits its validity conditions. Accordingly, it is valid in Johansen
simulations with data bases in which Φ = ΦP = 1 (including standard GTAP data
bases); approximate in non-linear simulations in which initially Φ = ΦP = 1; and
invalid otherwise.
While this is the major defect of the old decomposition, it is also in a way a merit,
since it allows the decomposition to be consistent with the old EV computation. More
specifically, the old EV computation and decomposition are consistent because they
use the same equation (4.3) for aggregate utility.

4.3

A revised treatment

Hanslow [4] presents a general welfare decomposition applicable to many CGE models.
For convenience, we base our derivation on the GTAP-specific Huff and Hertel ([6])
approach. As revised, the results are consistent with the Hanslow decomposition.
In revising the decomposition, we at first assume no changes in preferences, and
then extend our results to incorporate preference changes. Rearranging equation (2.35),
x = p + Φu, we obtain
u = Φ−1 (x − p)
= Φ−1 (y − p − n)
=Φ

−1

(Y

−1

by defn. of x

D − n)

from (4.1)

Substituting into equation (3.4), yEV = ΦEV u + n, we obtain
yEV =

ΦEV −1
(Y D − n) + n.
Φ

Then substituting into equation (3.1), d EV =
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1
100 YEV yEV ,

we obtain the decomposi-

tion scheme
d EV =

¸
·
1 ΦEV
1 ΦEV YEV
D−
− 1 YEV n.
100 Φ Y
100
Φ

This scheme suffers from one objectionable feature, the presence of a nuisance term
involving population growth n. In simulations with standard data bases (with Φ EV =
Φ = 1 initially), the term would typically be small but non-zero. We can remove
this nuisance by modifying the income decomposition, to decompose not real regional
income y − p but real per capita income x − p. Accordingly we write
Y (x − p) = D ∗ ,

(4.4)

where D ∗ represents a decomposition of real per capita income. Then proceeding as
before, we obtain
u = Φ−1 Y −1 D∗ ,
ΦEV −1 ∗
yEV =
Y D + n,
Φ
and

1
1 ΦEV YEV ∗
D +
YEV n.
100 Φ Y
100
Now instead of a nuisance term, we have an interpretable term in population growth n.
Finally, we incorporate preference changes. Instead of the simpler equation (2.35),
we begin with the more complete equation (2.45),
X
u=c+
Bi (log Ui )bi + Φ−1 (x − p)
d EV =

i

=c+

X

Bi (log Ui )bi + Φ−1 Y −1 D∗ ,

i

substituting from equation (4.4). Also, adapting equation (2.45), we have
³
´
X
Bi (log UEV i )bi + u + n,
yEV = ΦEV −c −
i

where UEV i denotes the level of good i in the top-level utility function, in the shadow
demand system with initial prices but current utility and preferences. Then proceeding
as before, we obtain
¶
X µ
1
UEV i
d EV = −
Bi log
ΦEV YEV
bi
100
Ui
i
(4.5)
1 ΦEV YEV ∗
1
+
D +
YEV n.
100 Φ Y
100
We note that changes c in the utility scaling factor do not affect the equivalent
variation, and that changes in the distribution parameters affect it only when corre-
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lated with differences between the
P actual and shadow subutilities Ui and UEV i (since
P
i Bi log Ui ). If both distribution parameter changes
i Bi log UEV i = log(U/C) =
and price changes favor usage of top-level good i, then the effect of the distribution
parameter changes on utility is more favorable with final prices than with initial prices,
so expenditure in the shadow system needs to be higher than it would otherwise, so the
contribution to the equivalent variation is positive. Conversely, if the distribution parameter for good i increases while price changes operate to discourage its consumption,
the contribution to the equivalent variation is negative.

4.4

Decomposing real per capita income

Based on Huff and Hertel [6], we have a decomposition of real regional income:
(all,r,REG)
INCOME(r)*[y(r) - p(r)]
=
sum{i, ENDW_COMM, VOA(i,r)*qo(i,r)} - VDEP(r)*kb(r)
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, VOA(j,r)*ao(j,r)}
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, VVA(j,r)*ava(j,r)}
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, sum{i, ENDW_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*afe(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, sum{i, TRAD_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*af(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{s, REG, sum{i, TRAD_COMM, sum{m, MARG_COMM,
VTMFSD(m,i,s,r)*atmfsd(m,i,r,s)
}}}
+ sum{i, NSAV_COMM, PTAX(i,r)*qo(i,r)}
+ sum{i, ENDW_COMM, sum{j, PROD_COMM, ETAX(i,j,r)*qfe(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, sum{i, TRAD_COMM, IFTAX(i,j,r)*qfm(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{j, PROD_COMM, sum{i, TRAD_COMM, DFTAX(i,j,r)*qfd(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, IPTAX(i,r)*qpm(i,r)}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, DPTAX(i,r)*qpd(i,r)}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, IGTAX(i,r)*qgm(i,r)}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, DGTAX(i,r)*qgd(i,r)}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, sum{s, REG, XTAXD(i,r,s)*qxs(i,r,s)}}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, sum{s, REG, MTAX(i,s,r)*qxs(i,s,r)}}
+ sum{i, TRAD_COMM, sum{s, REG, VXWD(i,r,s)*pfob(i,r,s)}}
+ sum{m, MARG_COMM, VST(m,r)*pm(m,r)}
- sum{i, TRAD_COMM, sum{s, REG, VXWD(i,s,r)*pfob(i,s,r)}}
- sum{m, MARG_COMM, VTMD(m,r)*pt(m)}
+ NETINV(r)*pcgds(r) - SAVE(r)*psave(r)
;

This is a equation from Huff and Hertel [6], modified to conform to the new treatment
of international margins and new notation for tax revenue coefficients introduced in
release 5 of the GTAP model. The right hand side is the expression represented above
as D. Rearranging, and subtracting INCOME(r)*pop(r) from both sides, we obtain a
decomposition for real per capita income:
(all,r,REG)
INCOME(r)*[y(r) - pop(r) - p(r)]
=
sum{i,ENDW_COMM, VOA(i,r)*[qo(i,r) - pop(r)]}
- VDEP(r)*[kb(r) - pop(r)]
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+
+
+
+
+

+
+

+

+

+
+
+
+
+

+

+
+
+
;

sum{j,PROD_COMM, VOA(j,r)*ao(j,r)}
sum{j,PROD_COMM, VVA(j,r)*ava(j,r)}
sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,ENDW_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*afe(i,j,r)}}
sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*af(i,j,r)}}
sum{s,REG, sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{m,MARG_COMM,
VTMFSD(m,i,s,r)*atmfsd(m,i,r,s)
}}}
sum{i,NSAV_COMM, PTAX(i,r)*[qo(i,r) - pop(r)]}
sum{i,ENDW_COMM, sum{j,PROD_COMM,
ETAX(i,j,r)*[qfe(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM,
IFTAX(i,j,r)*[qfm(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM,
DFTAX(i,j,r)*[qfd(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, IPTAX(i,r)*[qpm(i,r) - pop(r)]}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, DPTAX(i,r)*[qpd(i,r) - pop(r)]}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, IGTAX(i,r)*[qgm(i,r) - pop(r)]}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, DGTAX(i,r)*[qgd(i,r) - pop(r)]}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG,
XTAXD(i,r,s)*[qxs(i,r,s) - pop(r)]
}}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG,
MTAX(i,s,r)*[qxs(i,s,r) - pop(r)]
}}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG, VXWD(i,r,s)*pfob(i,r,s)}}
sum{m,MARG_COMM, VST(m,r)*pm(m,r)}
sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG, VXWD(i,s,r)*pfob(i,s,r)}}
sum{m,MARG_COMM, VTMD(m,r)*pt(m)}
NETINV(r)*pcgds(r)
SAVE(r)*psave(r)

Here the right hand side is the expression referred to above as D ∗ .
Unlike for example Hanslow [4], we do not introduce into the decomposition a new
term involving population. Instead we incorporate the population variable into the
terms involving quantity variables. We prefer this approach for several reasons.
• Looking forward to the equivalent variation decomposition, it does not create there
a nuisance term involving population growth. There is indeed still a population
growth term. It is however no longer a nuisance term but an interpretable term,
expressing the intuition that in the absence of imbalances in growth, income grows
equiproportionally with population.
• It does lead to a redefinition of the endowment terms. We recognize now an
increase in utility arising not from growth in total endowments, but from growth
in endowments per capita. While change admittedly is bad, this change is not
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very bad, since the new endowment terms are as readily interpretable as the old
ones.
• It leads also to a redefinition of the allocative efficiency effects, but here the
change is for the better. With balanced growth in a distorted economy, the old
decomposition reported an allocative efficiency improvement associated with every taxed flow, and an allocative efficiency deterioration associated with every
subsidised flow. Intuitively however, balanced growth involves no change in allocative efficiency. The new decomposition here conforms to intuition better than
the old.

4.5

Implementation

To implement the new treatment, we need to define the new population growth term in
the decomposition, and revise the old terms. The old terms included a factor representU N
ing Ū
Ȳ /Y . The new terms include instead a factor representing (ΦEV /Φ)(YEV /Y ).
N̄
N
Ȳ in the old factor is an approximation to YEV (provided
Since the numerator U
Ū N̄
that the elasticity of income with respect to utility is initially equal to one), and since
ΦEV /Φ in the new factor is (for small changes) approximately equal to one, the old
factor may be considered an approximation to the new one.
To implement the new treatment, we first compute the equivalent variation scaling
factor (ΦEV /Φ)(YEV /Y ):
3180
3181
3182
3183
3184

Coefficient (all,r,REG)
EVSCALFACT(r) #equivalent variation scaling factor#;
Formula (all,r,REG)
EVSCALFACT(r)
= [UTILELASEV(r)/UTILELAS(r)]*[INCOMEEV(r)/INCOME(r)];

We then revise the decomposition-based computation of equivalent variation, using
equation (4.5) and the real per capita income decomposition obtained in subsection 4.4.
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212

Variable (Linear,Change)(all,r,REG)
EV_ALT(r) # regional EV computed in alternative way #;
Equation EV_DECOMPOSITION
# decomposition of Equivalent Variation #
(all,r,REG)
EV_ALT(r)
= - 0.01*UTILELASEV(r)*INCOMEEV(r)*[
DPARPRIV(r)*loge(UTILPRIVEV(r)/UTILPRIV(r))*dppriv(r)
+ DPARGOV(r)*loge(UTILGOVEV(r)/UTILGOV(r))*dpgov(r)
+ DPARSAVE(r)*loge(UTILSAVEEV(r)/UTILSAVE(r))*dpsave(r)
]
+
[0.01*EVSCALFACT(r)]
* [
sum{i,NSAV_COMM, PTAX(i,r)*[qo(i,r) - pop(r)]}
+ sum{i,ENDW_COMM, sum{j,PROD_COMM,
ETAX(i,j,r)*[qfe(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
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3213
3214
3215
3216
3217
3218
3219
3220
3221
3222
3223
3224
3225
3226
3227
3228
3229
3230
3231
3232
3233
3234
3235
3236
3237
3238
3239
3240
3241
3242
3243
3244

+ sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM,
IFTAX(i,j,r)*[qfm(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
+ sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM,
DFTAX(i,j,r)*[qfd(i,j,r) - pop(r)]
}}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, IPTAX(i,r)*[qpm(i,r) - pop(r)]}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, DPTAX(i,r)*[qpd(i,r) - pop(r)]}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, IGTAX(i,r)*[qgm(i,r) - pop(r)]}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, DGTAX(i,r)*[qgd(i,r) - pop(r)]}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG,
XTAXD(i,r,s)*[qxs(i,r,s) - pop(r)]
}}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG,
MTAX(i,s,r)*[qxs(i,s,r) - pop(r)]
}}
+ sum{i,ENDW_COMM, VOA(i,r)*[qo(i,r) - pop(r)]}
- VDEP(r)*[kb(r) - pop(r)]
+ sum{i,PROD_COMM, VOA(i,r)*ao(i,r)}
+ sum{j,PROD_COMM, VVA(j,r)*ava(j,r)}
+ sum{i,ENDW_COMM, sum{j,PROD_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*afe(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{j,PROD_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM, VFA(i,j,r)*af(i,j,r)}}
+ sum{m,MARG_COMM, sum{i,TRAD_COMM,
sum{s,REG, VTMFSD(m,i,s,r)*atmfsd(m,i,s,r)}}}
+ sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG, VXWD(i,r,s)*pfob(i,r,s)}}
+ sum{m,MARG_COMM, VST(m,r)*pm(m,r)}
+ NETINV(r)*pcgds(r)
- sum{i,TRAD_COMM, sum{s,REG, VXWD(i,s,r)*pfob(i,s,r)}}
- sum{m,MARG_COMM, VTMD(m,r)*pt(m)}
- SAVE(r)*psave(r)
]
+ 0.01*INCOMEEV(r)*pop(r);

Consistency between this and the standard equivalent variation computation is a check
on the validity of the decomposition.
Finally we compute various components of the change in equivalent variation. We
compute first the distributional parameter component:
3252
3253
3254
3255
3256
3257
3258
3259

Variable (Linear,Change) (all,r,REG) CNTdpar(r)
# contribution to EV of change in distribution parameters#;
Equation CNT_WEV_dpar (all,r,REG)
CNTdpar(r) = -0.01*UTILELASEV(r)*INCOMEEV(r)*[
DPARPRIV(r)*loge(UTILPRIVEV(r)/UTILPRIV(r))*dppriv(r)
+ DPARGOV(r)*loge(UTILGOVEV(r)/UTILGOV(r))*dpgov(r)
+ DPARSAVE(r)*loge(UTILSAVEEV(r)/UTILSAVE(r))*dpsave(r)
];

and the population component:
3261
3262

Variable (Linear,Change) (all,r,REG) CNTpop(r)
#contribution to EV in region r of change in population#;

44

3263
3264

Equation CONT_WEV_pop (all,r,REG)
CNTpop(r) = 0.01*INCOMEEV(r)*pop(r);

The other components derive from the real per capita income decomposition. They are
generally similar to the corresponding components of the old decomposition, but with
the new scaling factor replacing the old. For instance, for the allocative efficiency effect
associated with production subsidies and income taxes, we have corresponding to the
first term in the decomposition:
3266
3267
3268
3269
3270

Variable (Linear,Change) (all,r,REG) CNTqor(r)
#contribution to EV in region r of output changes#;
Equation CONT_WEV_qor (all,r,REG)
CNTqor(r)
= sum{i,NSAV_COMM, 0.01*EVSCALFACT(r)*PTAX(i,r)*[qo(i,r) - pop(r)]};

The code for the remaining components is not reproduced here but may be found in
the associated program source file.

5

Properties and behavior of the final demand system

Having described the implementation of the new demand system, we now consider its
behavior and properties. There are certain properties that the revised model should
display, that can be precisely specified and mathematically demonstrated. We are also
concerned to develop a practical feeling for its behavior: how different its results are
from the old system, what new kinds of behavior can be observed, and how greatly
they are likely to affect simulation results. In discussing these matters, we refer to
results from various illustrative simulations from the software package accompanying
this documentation (see appendix C). Except where otherwise stated, these are based
on a trade liberalisation scenario involving removal of import barriers within the APEC
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) group of countries (experiment 1 in [9]).
In the new treatment, the model should display several readily checked properties:
• All variables except utility from private consumption (uP ) and overall utility (u)
are invariant with respect to rescalings of the CDE expansion parameters (R i or
INCPAR). The software package includes a pair of simulations with the old theory,
old with the standard INCPAR, and oincpar with rescaled INCPAR. Most variables
are the same in the two simulations (to the numerical accuracy of the solution),
but some variables, including not only u and up but also EV, EV_ALT, and WEV are
about one order of magnitude greater in oincpar. The package also includes a
similar pair of simulations with the new theory, new with the standard INCPAR
and nincpar with the rescaled INCPAR. Now we find that u and up differ in the
two simulations, but EV, EV_ALT, and WEV are the same. This verifies that the new
system avoids the gross errors of the old system in calculating equivalent variation
with non-standard INCPAR (section 3.2).
• All variables except utility (u) are invariant with respect to changes in the initial level of the sum of the upper-level distribution parameters (B or DPARSUM).
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This can be verified by comparing results between simulations new, with standard
settings for DPARSUM, and ndparsum, with rescaled DPARSUM.
• In quantity homogeneity tests—that is, simulations in which uniform shocks are
applied to population, factor endowments, and any other exogenous quantity
variables—all components of the EV decomposition except the population component are zero. The simulation nqhom verifies that the new system has this
property, while oqhom confirms that the old system doesn’t.
The first property is not obvious, since rescalings of the expansion parameters do
affect the utility elasticity of private consumption expenditure, and, in the linearised
equation system, changes in the utility elasticity of private consumption expenditure
affect the upper-level allocation of income. Nevertheless, as the following proposition
shows, it does apply:
Proposition 7 With an upper-level Cobb-Douglas demand system and a bottom-level
CDE system, with distribution parameters calibrated to a given initial equilibrium,
rescaling the CDE expansion parameters has no effect on quantities demanded, or on
the equivalent variation.
Proof. Suppose that the CDE expansion parameters Ri maximizing U K with the old expansion parameters is equivalent to maximizing U with the new expansion parameters.
So rescaling the CDE expansion parameters does not affect the private consumption
demand system. It does affect the upper level of the final demand system, since the
elasticity of private consumption expenditure with respect to utility from private consumption is linearly homogeneous in the CDE expansion parameters. To calibrate to
the observed income allocation, however, when we rescale the expansion parameters by
a factor K, we need also to multiply by K the upper-level distribution parameter for
private consumption. With that adjustment, the new system yields the same upperlevel budget shares as the old system. So lower-level quantities demanded are the same
with the new system as with the old (though utility UP from private consumption,
and overall utility U , are different). Since the demand functions are unaffected by the
parameter rescaling, the equivalent variation is also unaffected.
In the private consumption demand system, as income increases, the budget share
of commodities with higher expansion parameters increases. Then because of the
expansion-parameter weighting of XWCONSHR, the utility elasticity uepriv also increases.
This leads to a shift away from private consumption toward government consumption
and saving. In addition, reductions in relative prices of commodities with low expansion parameters (with sufficiently low price elasticities) typically decrease their budget
share, again leading to increases in uepriv and reallocation of income away from private
consumption toward government consumption and saving.
In standard GTAP data bases, the greatest differences in expansion parameters are
typically between food and non-food commodities, the expansion parameters of food
commodities typically being much lower than those of non-food. Accordingly, the share
of private consumption in regional income typically varies directly with food prices.
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Table 1: EV under old and new treatments (US$ billion)

North America
Japan
Australia and New Zealand
China incl. Hong Kong
Taiwan
South Korea
Malaysia and Singapore
Thailand and Philippines
Indonesia
Rest of world

Old

New

Percentage
difference

-2.756
47.473
0.629
6.064
4.517
9.242
1.914
-1.355
0.577
-15.272

-2.625
47.230
0.641
6.146
4.458
9.055
1.926
-1.329
0.583
-14.731

-4.8
-0.5
1.9
1.4
-1.3
-2.0
0.6
-1.9
1.0
-3.5

Source: Simulations old, new
Experience to date with the old and new models with aggregated standard data
bases suggest some tentative generalizations:
• In moving from the old to the new treatment, corrections to the welfare variables
are typically small. For example, in our illustrative trade liberalisation experiment, the differences in regional EV between the old and new treatments are all
less than 5 per cent (table 1).
• While under the new treatment, the upper-level allocation of income depends on
the income level, it is rather insensitive to it. Table 2 shows changes in money
income and in major income disposition aggregates in an experiment in which
factor productivity doubles in all industries in all regions. It reports just two income disposition aggregates, private consumption expenditure and “other”, where
“other” includes both government consumption expenditure and saving; since in
the absence of preference shifts, the percentage changes in government consumption expenditure and saving are equal. As it shows, in each region the ratio of
“other” to private consumption expenditure rises, but in no region by very much;
the maximum increase being 12.2 per cent in China and Hong Kong, and the
minimum 2.7 per cent in Japan.
• Under the new treatment, the upper-level allocation of income may be affected
appreciably by changes in relative prices of commodities with different expansion
parameters. In particular, in low- and middle-income countries, the upper-level
allocation of income is liable to be affected by changes in the price of food relative
to other commodities. The upper-level allocation is typically less sensitive to
food prices in high income countries, since there the share of food in private
consumption expenditure is typically low.
Table 3 shows results from an experiment in which subsidies are placed on food
47

Table 2: Effects on income and major disposition aggregates of a doubling of factor
productivity (with new treatment; percentage changes)

North America
Japan
Australia and New Zealand
China incl. Hong Kong
Taiwan
South Korea
Malaysia and Singapore
Thailand and Philippines
Indonesia
Rest of world

Income

Private
consumption
expenditure

Other

Ratio
other:
private

113.6
114.3
112.7
107.4
104.8
108.6
112.0
107.5
104.7
114.2

111.8
112.4
109.0
99.8
100.6
103.0
107.3
103.7
99.1
110.6

119.3
118.2
121.8
124.2
109.8
116.5
117.9
115.2
112.0
123.1

3.5
2.7
6.1
12.2
4.6
6.6
5.1
5.6
6.5
5.9

Note: “Other” includes government consumption expenditure and saving.
Source: Simulation income
production so that the ratio of the market value to producer earnings from food
sales falls by one half. In each case there is an increase in the ratio of government
consumption expenditure and saving to private consumption expenditure. This
increase is due to, and equal to, the increase in the elasticity of private consumption expenditure to utility, ΦP (equations (2.27)–(2.29) show why they are equal).
The elasticity decreases because there is a decrease in the budget share of food,
and food has an unusually low CDE expansion parameter Rfood , ranging between
0.13 for Australian and New Zealand and 0.63 for Indonesia (as in standard GTAP
databases, the expansion parameters are normalized so that across commodities
they average to 1; for the relation between the expansion parameters and the
utility elasticity, see equation (2.33)). The food budget share decreases because
the price of food decreases and demand for food is price-inelastic. The effect on
the macro expenditure ratio is greatest in two of the poorer regions, China and
Indonesia, and least in two of the richer regions, North America and Japan.

6

Future work

Given the problems with the old system, there are some alternative approaches to that
taken in this paper, some sketched briefly above (subsection 2.5). An obvious possibility
for future work is to explore some of these approaches more fully.
In our judgement, however, a more fruitful approach may be to explore the empirics
of the top-level demand system. The new system generates more complex behavior
than the old; in particular, the share of private consumption in national income tends
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Table 3: Effects of a food subsidy (with new treatment; percentage changes)

North America
Japan
Australia and New Zealand
China incl. Hong Kong
Taiwan
South Korea
Malaysia and Singapore
Thailand and Philippine
Indonesia
Rest of world
a
b

Food
price

Ratio
other:
private a

-60.3
-60.9
-59.4
-55.3
-64.9
-57.3
-59.9
-59.9
-57.5
-60.8

4.0
4.2
5.8
14.5
8.1
8.5
7.2
8.9
10.5
7.0

uepriv

Food
budget
share b

Rfood
(level)

4.0
4.2
5.8
14.5
8.1
8.5
7.2
8.9
10.5
7.0

-54.6
-54.6
-49.2
-32.9
-54.2
-45.4
-49.5
-43.5
-40.3
-51.9

0.20
0.45
0.13
0.52
0.57
0.48
0.49
0.58
0.63
0.32

“Other” includes government consumption expenditure and saving.
Share of food in private consumption expenditure

Source: Simulation food
to vary directly with national income. However the magnitude of the variation is not
based on empirical estimates, but emerges as a side effect from other features of the
demand system. A good next step would be to research the empirics of this relationship,
and review the functional form and parameterization of the new demand system in the
light of that research.
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Appendix A

The demand system and the Gorman conditions

As discussed in the main text (subsection 2.2), the old upper-level demand theory is in
error. One way to view the error is that it mistakenly imposes a two-stage budgeting
scheme on a preference system that does not support it. It is natural then to inquire
how this error relates to the well-known Gorman conditions [2] for the feasibility of
two-stage budgeting.
The Gorman conditions apply in the context of weak separability. A system is said
to be weakly separable if the utility function can be represented in the form
U (Q) = U• (U1 (Q1 ), . . . , UG (QG )),
where Q1 , . . . , QG is a partition of the quantity vector Q into subvectors representing
groups of commodities. The function U• is the upper-level utility function, and the
U1 , . . . , UG are lower-level utilities or subutilities. In a weakly separable system, the
Gorman conditions are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an
upper-level demand system
max

U•∗ (U1∗ , . . . , UG∗ )

subject to

G
X

Pi∗ Ui∗ = X,

(A.1)

i=1

where Pi∗ and Ui∗ are price and quantity indices for the i’th lower-level subsystem, and
U•∗ a utility index, such that the solution for the upper-level system is consistent with
the solution for the overall system. Note that the quantity indices Ui∗ may or may not
be the subutilities Ui . Also, the utility index U•∗ may or may not be similar in form to
the upper-level utility function U• .
By construction, the GTAP regional household demand system is weakly separable.
The error in the old derivation is the assumption that utility from private consumption can serve as a quantity index for private consumption in the upper-level demand
system (A.1). As shown above (subsection 2.2), if we try to use utility from private
consumption as the quantity index, we find there is no corresponding price index. This
does not mean that the regional household demand system does not meet the Gorman
conditions; price and quantity indices for private consumption might yet be found; it
means only that the quantity index cannot be the subutility.
On the other hand, even if suitable price and quantity indices did exist, that would
not necessarily validate the old treatment. It would show that we could specify an
upper-level demand system that treated private consumption as an ordinary good, but
it would not guarantee that the utility index U•∗ in that system was of the Cobb-Douglas
form, nor that the demands had the Cobb-Douglas fixed budget shares property. In
short, the requirements for the validity of the old treatment are more stringent than
the Gorman conditions.
Gorman [2] shows that an upper-level system of the desired form can be constructed
under either of two alternative conditions. One alternative is that the lower-level sys-
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tems are homothetic. Under this alternative, the quantity indices are just the lower-level
utilities, and the utility index is just the upper-level utility function. The other
P alternative is that the upper-level utility function is additive, U• (U1 , . . . , UG ) = G
i=1 Ui ,
and the lower-level systems admit indirect utility functions of the Gorman generalized
polar form,
¶
µ
Xi
Ψi (Pi , Xi ) = Fi
+ Ai (Pi ).
(A.2)
Mi (Pi )
Under this alternative, the quantity indices Ui∗ P
= Xi /Mi (Pi ), the price indices Pi∗ =
∗
∗
∗
∗
Mi (Pi ), and the utility index U• (U1 , . . . , UG ) = G
i=1 Fi (Ui ).
As we have seen already, the GTAP final regional household demand system does
not meet the first condition, that the lower-level demand systems be homothetic. It
seems obvious, but is not easily proved, that except in degenerate cases, the CDE and
Gorman generalized polar forms are incompatible.
Conjecture 1 If a demand system is both a CDE system and a Gorman generalized
polar form, then it is a CES system.
As noted above, it is possible to satisfy the Gorman conditions without validating
the old treatment of the upper-level demand system. More specifically, solutions involving homothetic lower-level demand systems validate the old treatment, but solutions
involving the Gorman generalized polar form do not. In particular, the old treatment
specifies a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form, but the solutions involving the
Gorman generalized polar form require a utility function of the additive form. Note
that additivity is a much stronger requirement than additive separability;
the CobbP
Douglas utility function
can
be
written
as
additively
separable
(U
=
B
logU
i
i ), but
P
not as additive (U =
Ui ).
On the one hand, it is true to say that the old treatment is erroneous because the
CDE system does not satisfy the Gorman conditions. It is true because, if the old
treatment were valid, the Gorman conditions would necessarily be satisfied. On the
other hand, the Gorman conditions are a something of a distraction in this context.
To show that the old derivation is invalid, we do not need to refer to the Gorman
conditions; it is sufficient, and simpler, to show that the private consumption demand
system is non-homothetic. Nevertheless, as we show below (appendix B), although the
Gorman result is not useful in refuting the old treatment, it is potentially useful in
remedying its defects.
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Appendix B

Alternative private consumption demand systems

As shown above (appendix A), unless we accept a homothetic private consumption
demand system, we must accept some changes to the upper-level system. On the other
hand, while not concerned to retain all aspects of the current upper-level system, we
would like to retain at least the fixed shares property. In this section we investigate
whether we can find a new form for the private consumption demand system such
as to preserve the fixed shares property while perhaps affecting other aspects of the
upper-level system.
Recalling equation (2.18),
Φ−1 Bi
Xi
= P i −1 ,
X
j Φ j Bj

we see that even when the elasticities Φ are not all equal to one, the budget shares
are constant provided that the elasticities are constant. This seems a hopeful notion:
with constant elasticities, we change some aspects of the upper-level system but retain
the fixed budget shares. As it turns out however, this approach imposes unacceptable
restrictions on the form of the lower-level systems.
Proposition 8 In any demand system, if the utility elasticity of expenditure is constant, the system is homothetic.

Proof. Let Ū denote some arbitrary utility level, and Φ the constant utility elasticity. If
the utility elasticity of expenditure is constant, then for any utility level U , E(P, U ) =
(U/Ū )Φ E(P, Ū ). But then we can write, for all P, U , E(P, U ) = Π(P)(U/Ū )Φ , where
Π(P) = E(P, Ū ). So, by proposition 1, the system is homothetic.
Since homotheticity is empirically unacceptable, this idea does not help us find an
acceptable form for the private consumption demand system.
We may also attempt to use the Gorman [2] conditions for two stage budgeting
to find a functional form for the private consumption demand system that lets us
preserve the upper-level demand system. This is a somewhat subtle strategy. We have
seen above (appendix A) that there is no non-homothetic private consumption demand
system that, in conjunction with a Cobb-Douglas upper-level utility function U• , leads
to fixed upper-level budget shares. There might yet however be a non-homothetic
private consumption demand system that, in conjunction with an upper-level utility
function not of the Cobb-Douglas form, leads to a Cobb-Douglas upper-level utility
index U•∗ . This is in fact feasible.
Of the two alternative conditions in [2], one entails homothetic lower-level demand
systems, which is unacceptable. The other condition however does allow an acceptable
solution.
Proposition 9 In a two-level demand system with an upper-level additive utility func-
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tion U• (U1 , . . . , UG ) =

PG

i=1 Ui

and lower-level indirect utility functions

Ψi (Pi , Xi ) = Bi log

Xi
+ Ai (Pi ),
Mi (Pi )

(B.1)

the upper-level expenditure shares are fixed.
Proof. In consumer equilibrium, the group expenditure levels Xi solve the problem
P
P
Find Xi to maximize i Ψi (Pi , Xi ) such that i Xi = X;
that is, with the specified form for the lower-level indirect utility functions Ψi ,
Find Xi to maximize
X
i

such that

P

i Xi

Bi log

µ

Xi
Mi (Pi )

¶

+

X

Ai (Pi )

i

= X.

Since the functions Ai do not involve group expenditure Xi , this is equivalent to
P
P
Find Xi to maximize i Bi log(Xi /Mi (Pi )) such that i Xi = X;

or, putting Ui∗ = Xi /Mi (Pi ), Pi = Mi (Pi ),
P
P
Find Ui∗ to maximize i Bi log Ui∗ such that i Pi Ui∗ = X.
This has the standard Cobb-Douglas solution

so the expenditure shares

Bi X
Ui∗ = P
,
j Bj P i
Xi
Pi Ui∗
Bi
,
=
=P
X
X
j Bj

so the expenditure shares are fixed, as was to be shown.
The functional form (B.1) covers both (with zero AG ) the Cobb-Douglas demand
system used in GTAP for government consumption, and (with non-zero AP ) a reasonably extensive class of non-homothetic private consumption demand systems. So
with the demand system of proposition 9, we can preserve the Cobb-Douglas government consumption system and the upper-level fixed shares, by changing the upper-level
utility function and the private consumption demand system.
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Appendix C

Accompanying Software

Accompanying this paper is a software package, including old and new versions of the
GTAP model, the illustrative simulations discussed in section 5, and a small aggregated
GTAP database.
The data files conform to the older Lahey binary structure rather than the new
Lahey/Fujitsu structure.
The software is designed to work with Microsoft Windows operating systems
(http://www.microsoft.com), the Cygwin working environment (http://cygwin.
com), Lahey Fortran compilers (http://www.lahey.com), and GEMPACK (http:
//www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm). Windows, Lahey, and GEMPACK are
likely familiar to most GTAP model users; Cygwin is a free software (http://www.gnu.
org/philosophy/free-sw.html) package that operates under Microsoft Windows but
provides a Unix-like modeler-friendly environment.
The build description file Makefile describes the relations between the source files
included in the package and the model and simulation files that can be generated from
them. It is written to work with the GNU implementation (http://www.gnu.org/
software/make/make.html) of the make build management program ([7]) included in
Cygwin. The shell script ltg.sh, adapted from the GEMPACK batch file ltg.bat, is
used to compile and link the TABLO-generated Fortran programs.
The file old.tab contains the GTAP model theoretical structure before the revisions
proposed in this paper. The file old.fts is the TABLO stored input file, containing
condensation information; ohom.cmf is the command file for a price homogeneity test,
containing closure information. The corresponding files for the revised model proposed
in this paper are gtap.tab, gtap.fts, and ghom.cmf.
Most of the illustrative simulations are based on a trade liberalisation scenario
involving removal of import barriers within the APEC group of countries (experiment 1
in [9]). The command file old.cmf defines this scenario for the old structure, new.cmf
for the new. They all use a 10-region 3-commodity data base. The sets file is gset.har
and the parameters file gpar.har; the flows data file is odat.har for the old theoretical
structure, and gdat.har for the new. Tariff shocks are read from a file tms.shk.
The command files oincpar.cmf and nincpar.cmf define the same scenario for the
old and new models, but with non-standard values for the expansion parameter (R i
or INCPAR). The non-standard values are contained in an alternative parameters file,
gpincpar.har, created from the standard parameters file gpar.har using the GEMPACK utility program modhar and the stored input file gpincpar.sti.
The command file ndparsum.cmf defines the same scenario for the new theoretical
structure, but with a non-standard value for the sum of the distribution parameters.
This non-standard value is read from an alternative data file gddparsum.har, created
from the standard data file gdat.har using the GEMPACK utility program modhar and
the stored input file gddparsum.sti.
We also include command files for a few other scenarios. The files oqhom.cmf and
nqhom.cmf define a quantity homogeneity test for the old and new theoretical structures. In the file income.cmf we increase real income by doubling factor productivity
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in all regions; in food.cmf, we lower the price of food using a production subsidy. As
discussed in section 5, these scenarios are designed to illustrate how the upper-level
income allocation is affected by price and income changes. Finally, the file dps.cmf implements a 20 per cent increase in the propensity to save; this demonstrates the use of
a non-standard closure for the upper level of the regional demand system, as discussed
in subsection 2.14.
The software has been tested with GNU make under the Cygwin bash shell under
MS Windows 4.10.2222 (that is, some flavor of MS Windows 98), with Lahey Fortran
90 version 4.5, and GEMPACK 7.0. The program files will likely also work under other
Win32 operating systems (MS Windows 95, ME, 2K, XP, . . . ) or (with a few simplifying
adjustments) under Unix or Linux. The data files however are MS Windows-specific.
To compile the solution programs and run all simulations, just type
make
from the Cygwin bash prompt. To create a specific file type “make” with the target
file name, say
make foo.sl4
There are a few dummy targets defined for special purposes: to make just the executable
program files, make the dummy target exes:
make exes
to remove all derived files and return to the original distribution,
make clean
to remove just the simulation-related files but not the (slow to remake) executables,
make simclean
The advantage of using make is that it does as much or as little work as necessary to
create or update the target files. So for example if you have an up-to-date executable
for a simulation that you want to run, make knows that it need not recompile the
executable before running the simulation; but if you have changed the source code for
the model since last you compiled it, then make knows that it does need to recompile.
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Appendix D
2003–09
2002–03

Revision History

Fix error in welfare decomposition.
Initial version.
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